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13 Sharia and national law inNigeria
Philip Ostien and Albert Dekker1
Abstract
The relations between sharia and national law in Nigeria have var-
ied widely from time to time and from place to place within the
country – which after all was first brought under a single adminis-
tration only in 1914. In sections 1-4 of this paper the complex his-
tory of our subject is sketched, culminating in the programmes of
‘sharia implementation’ that began in 1999 in twelve of Nigeria’s
northern states. Sections 5-9 concentrate thematically upon the pre-
sent day. Many details of the incorporation of sharia in the laws
of Nigeria are discussed, including the Sharia Courts and the
Sharia Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes now in place in the
sharia states, the continuing application of uncodified Islamic per-
sonal law and other Islamic civil law throughout the north, the ef-
fects of sharia implementation on women and non-Muslims, and
the constitutional questions the sharia implementation pro-
grammes raise. The conclusion, section 10, discusses the likely
fate of Islamic criminal law in the sharia states, and gives some
reason to think that sharia implementation has on the whole been
a positive development for Nigeria.
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The borders of present-day Nigeria were defined during the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, in the course of imperialist competition among
Britain, France, and Germany for colonies in West Africa. Nigeria, a British
colony, emerged as such in 1900, except that its eastern territories were
augmented after World War I by accessions from the ex-German Cameroons.
Nigeria was governed by the British until 1960, when it became an
independent nation. It was then organised as a federation of its Northern,
Eastern and Western Regions. It has since been divided into 36 states plus
the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja. Its population in 2006, according to
the census then taken, was about 140 million, the largest in Africa by far. Its
ethnic diversity is extreme: the World Factbook conservatively says there are
‘more than 250 ethnic groups’; the linguists list over five hundred living
languages.2 There are however three regional linguae franca, corresponding
to the three largest ethnic groups: Hausa in the North, Igbo in the East, and
Yoruba in the West. Moreover there has been a substantial dispersion of peo-
ple of all ethnic and linguistic backgrounds throughout the country, and
English, Nigeria’s official language, is also widely spoken. According to the
World Factbook, about 50 per cent of Nigeria’s population is Muslim, 40 per
cent Christian, and 10 per cent followers of African traditional religions. But
these numbers are estimates only, as no accepted census since 1958 has
gathered data on religious affiliation. Muslims predominate in the North,
Christians in the East and West, although again there has been a substantial
dispersion of people of all religious persuasions throughout the country.
(Source: Bartleby 2010, Lewis 2009)
13.1 The period until 1920
Partial Islamisation, partial Christianisation, and colonisation by
the British
In the early years of the nineteenth century, the territory which became
Nigeria was occupied by a heterogeneous assortment of peoples at
many different stages of cultural and political development. Some – for
instance the Yoruba and Benin kingdoms in the southwest and the
Muslim emirates in the north – had strong central authorities whose
writs ran far; most others were much more loosely and locally orga-
nised. Trade flourished along camel, donkey and headload routes criss-
crossing West Africa and extending northwards across the Sahara and
eastwards across the Sahel to the Nile. Trade along these routes in-
volved some peoples but passed many others by. Warfare and slave-raid-
ing were common. Slaves were traded within the country, and also ex-
ported, from the north to other parts of West Africa and across the
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desert to North Africa, and from the south to European slave traders at
the Atlantic coast. From the end of the fifteenth century, Portuguese
and later Dutch, French, and British merchants had established trading
posts on the coast, where for three centuries the Atlantic slave trade
thrived. But until the mid-nineteenth century European penetration
northward into or beyond the mangrove swamps and rain forests of the
coastal region was virtually nil, inhibited by disease. As the saying went:
‘The Bight of Benin, oh the Bight of Benin, where few come out though
many go in!’
Islam had reached the Borno region, in what is now north-eastern
Nigeria, beginning as early as the eleventh century, from north and east
across Sahara and Sahel. It came to Hausaland somewhat later, not only
from north and east but from the west, from the empires of Mali and
Songhay, where for several centuries Timbuktu was West Africa’s most
famous centre of Islamic learning. By the fifteenth century, Islam was
established in the Hausa city-states – Kano and Katsina perhaps most
famous among them. By 1750 it was the nominal, if only loosely ob-
served, religion of the ruling and merchant classes in all those parts of
the country (Hiskett 1984).
Islam received a new impulse in the north in the last quarter of the
eighteenth century, through the activities of the Fulani revivalist and re-
former Shehu Uthman dan Fodio. In twenty-five years of preaching
and teaching the Shehu gained a large following, his ‘Community’, to
the increasing alarm of the Hausa rulers whose corrupt and oppressive
practices he condemned. Measures of repression only exacerbated the
situation, finally triggering off the Fulani-led wars of jihad3 (1804 to
c. 1810 in Hausaland, and continuing elsewhere for many years there-
after) which established the ‘Sokoto Caliphate’ (Johnston 1967; Last
1967). Covering much of what subsequently became Nigeria’s Northern
Region, the Sokoto Caliphate was a loose confederation of emirates, all
owing suzerainty to the Sultan of Sokoto. At least under its first leaders
the Caliphate was inspired by religious zeal: by the desire to purify so-
ciety of un-Islamic practices and to live solely according to the sharia.
In particular, the Fulani ‘made it their aim, in the states which they set
up, to enforce Islamic law exclusively […] and to outlaw customary and
administrative law’ (Schacht 1964: 86). There were some thirty emi-
rates in all. The people under their rule were most of the many tribes
of Northern Nigeria, some more or less Muslim and some not. The rul-
ing houses were all Muslim and mostly Fulani. The Fulani failed in
their war against Borno in the northeast, itself a Muslim empire of an-
cient vintage. When the British arrived, the only parts of the Northern
Region not under the sway of one or the other of these two Muslim em-
pires of Sokoto and Borno were the Igala, Idoma, Tiv, and Jukun areas
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in the south, the high plateau in the centre which now has Jos as its ca-
pital, and scattered pockets of peoples elsewhere. With these exceptions,
throughout the North
Islamic law […] was still near its highest degree of practical ap-
plication. Custom, if not entirely eradicated, had been pushed
into the background, and the only existing tribunals were those
of the qadis [Hausa: alkalis4] who were competent in all matters,
including penal law. Only the customary land law remained va-
lid and was enforced by the councils of the sultan and of the
emirs (ibid).
British penetration of the Nigerian interior began with the second jour-
ney of Mungo Park across West Africa from Senegambia (1805-1806).
Park passed through a slice of Nigeria on his way down the Niger River
in 1806, but he died at Bussa before reaching the sea. It was only with
the visits of Hugh Clapperton and his colleagues, first southward across
the desert from Tripoli to Borno, Kano, Sokoto and back (1822-1825),
and then from Badagry on the coast northward to Kano and Sokoto
again (1825-1827), that real knowledge of the country began to be
gained. British explorers then quickly confirmed the course of the
Niger from Bussa to the sea, and its relation to the lower parts of the
River Benue (1830-1831). But repeated attempts to sail or steam up the
Niger/Benue system were frustrated by extremely high death rates from
malaria. Finally, in 1854, William Baikie led an expedition up the Niger
with no loss of life, protecting his men by administering quinine; this
pioneering prophylactic use of quinine against malaria was a turning
point in the European penetration of Nigeria and indeed of Africa. At
the time of Baikie’s expedition, another of the great European explorers
of Africa – Heinrich Barth, in the service of the British Foreign Office –
was nearing the end of his extended visit to the northern parts of the
country. Like Clapperton on his first visit, Barth came south across the
desert from Tripoli, spending five years (1850-1855) travelling in the re-
gion from Borno and Adamawa in the east to Kano, Katsina, Sokoto,
Gwandu and all the way to Timbuktu in the west. Barth’s Travels and
Discoveries in North and Central Africa (1857-1859, five volumes) is one
of the great works of scientific observation and analysis of the nine-
teenth century.
From the mid-nineteenth century, the British gradually extended their
influence into Nigeria. In 1849 and 1852 they declared protectorates
over the Bights of Benin and Biafra, at the southern coast. In 1861 they
annexed Lagos. Trade with the interior (notably for palm oil, used
among other things to lubricate the industrial revolution in Britain),
Christian missionary activity, and political control, all gradually
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increased. At the Berlin Conference (1885), the British were granted a
protectorate over the southern parts of Nigeria (comprising the later
Eastern and Western Regions). In 1886, seeking to extend their domin-
ions northward at the least possible expense, the British granted the
National African Company, now renamed the Royal Niger Company, a
charter empowering it to govern as well as to trade throughout the still
vaguely-defined territories of the later Northern Region, all expenses of
government to be paid out of revenues from trade. Treaties were signed
between the Company and a number of northern rulers, including the
Sultan of Sokoto, purportedly ceding extensive rights to the Company
(Flint 1960: 89, 129-155). The Company, however, never managed to
achieve ‘effective occupation’ of the North – the new criterion for interna-
tional recognition of territorial claims laid down at the Berlin Conference
– even along the banks of the Niger and Benue rivers where its trading
posts were sited. In 1900 the British revoked the Company’s charter and
declared the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, making Frederick Lugard
High Commissioner. Units of Britain’s West African Frontier Force then
quickly defeated the forces of various lesser emirates where resistance to
British rule was offered (1901-1902); Borno capitulated without a fight;
and in 1903 Kano and Sokoto were taken, the latter only after a bloody
battle (Muffett 1964). The North was administered separately until, in
1914, the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria were amalga-
mated with the Colony of Lagos under the name of the Colony and
Protectorate of Nigeria. Lugard was the first Governor-General of the
amalgamated Nigeria (1914-1919) as he had been the first High
Commissioner of its Northern Region (1900-1906).5
Lugard is famous for his articulation of the sometime British policy
of ‘indirect rule’, according to which colonial powers should not attempt
to step directly into the shoes of indigenous rulers, but should govern
through them. The British would rule, but local administration would
be by native rulers, institutions, and laws found already in place, which
would only gradually be modified or developed under British guidance.
The testing-ground for Lugard’s policies was initially Northern Nigeria
under Lugard himself. When, in 1914, he became the first Governor-
General of the whole country, Lugard extended his system of indirect
rule to the Southern provinces as well (Perham 1937).
For Northern Nigeria, a major effect of indirect rule was to perpetu-
ate and strengthen the rule of the Muslim emirates of Sokoto and
Borno. In their search for indigenous authorities through whom to rule,
the British did not go behind the ruling houses of the emirates to the
peoples they ruled. On the contrary, the emirs and those already hold-
ing office under them were confirmed in power, under the name of
‘Native Authorities’, and emirate administration was sometimes even
extended by the British to previously independent Northern peoples. ‘A
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policy of preserving the very special identity of the Northern Provinces
was consciously followed’ (Perham 1937: 326). Under this regime ‘the
north entrenched itself in a policy of self-protective withdrawal from
Western culture, whereas people in the south were deeply influenced by
it’ (Rasmussen 1993: 43). When, with the approach of independence,
the principle of federalism was introduced into the government of
Nigeria, and the Northern Region gained its own legislative and execu-
tive bodies, these in turn were initially dominated by the emirate ruling
classes. The giant Northern Region, comprising about two-thirds of the
land-mass of Nigeria and about one-half its population, dominated as it
was by Muslims, and the much smaller but more modernised and
Christianised Eastern and Western Regions, eyed each other with mu-
tual distaste and suspicion as independence approached. The North,
much slower to embrace Western education, feared that if self-govern-
ment came too soon, Southerners would get all the best jobs in the
North, if they did not actually dominate it. For their part the East and
West feared domination at the centre by the more populous North, and
a possible programme of Islamisation of the whole country by Northern
rulers. But we have gone ahead of our story.
As to the law and its administration, indirect rule implied two sys-
tems (broadly speaking) of law, administered by two systems of courts.
On the one hand there was ‘native law and custom’ – defined to include
Islamic law – applied in most cases involving natives, in Native Courts
staffed by native judges, according to native rules of procedure and evi-
dence. In the North, consistently with emirate rule, most Native Courts
were emir’s or alkali’s courts, and native law and custom was largely
equated with Islamic law of the Maliki school. But even in the North, in
the non-Muslim areas, and of course throughout the rest of the country,
all of the more or less vague bodies of native law and custom of the
many local ethnic groups were also applied in the Native Courts serving
their territories. On the other hand there was ‘English’ law. Public law,
including Orders in Council of the Government of Britain (in the case
of Nigeria’s colonial constitutions) and some of the enactments of the
Governors-General, was of course ‘English’. The British also enacted
various other laws specific to Nigeria, including penal laws, and im-
ported their statutes of general application, their doctrines of equity,
and their common law. English law was applied in English courts
staffed by British judges, according to British rules of procedure and
evidence. On its private side, English law was originally intended for ap-
plication primarily to non-natives, and most by far of all cases coming
before Nigerian courts – upwards of 90 per cent, including, for a long
time, criminal cases – were handled in the Native Courts according to
native law and custom. The proviso was that no native law or custom
should be enforced which was ‘repugnant to natural justice, equity and
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good conscience [as determined by the British] or incompatible either
directly or by necessary implication with any [English] law for the time
being in force’ (Keay & Richardson 1966: 233-238). Under this rule the
penalties imposed in the Native Courts, in particular, were quickly
brought under control. Mutilation – in the North whether as hudud6 or
as qisas7 – was abolished; death sentences had to be carried out in a hu-
mane manner (Milner 1969: 263-264). Various means were used to en-
force the repugnancy rule, including supervision of the Native Courts
by British administrative authorities and finally, in 1933, rights of appeal
from the Native to the English courts.
Islamic law never made the same impact in the southern parts of
Nigeria as it had in the North. Islam did enter the South, notably what
became the Western Region, where there is some record of Muslim
communities already in the seventeenth century; Islam was well estab-
lished in the Yoruba towns along the route to Lagos when the British
began to extend their control there in the second half of the nineteenth
century. But the character of the Islam practiced by the people of this
part of the country was different from that of the North: faithful to that
part of the sharia known as ibadat, which regulates matters of religious
belief and worship, but much less concerned than in the North about
mu’amalat, which regulates the conduct of Muslims in social life and is
enforced in the qadi’s courts.
The majority [of Southern Muslims] appear content to follow the
religion of Islam more or less closely in matters of doctrine and
ritual but to adhere to their tribal customs in such matters as
marriage, divorce, adultery, guardianship and succession
(Anderson 1954: 222).
The British found no Islamic courts in this region when they took over,
nor were any established by them: ‘no specifically Muslim court nor
any formal application of Islamic law is known throughout the South,
even in those areas where the proportion of Muslims is high’ (ibid).
This has remained true until quite recently. The establishment, begin-
ning in 2002, of ‘Independent Sharia Panels’ in some Western cities, is
a subject to which we shall return below.
13.2 The period from 1920 until 1965
The making of a nation; the settlement at independence of the
place of Islamic law
Much of the story of this period has to do with the constitutional
change that occurred with increasing rapidity after World War II,
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culminating in Nigerian independence in 1960. This subsumed a ma-
jor change in the administration of Islamic law in the Northern Region
that also took effect in 1960. We deal with these matters in turn.
Constitutional change 1920 to 1960
Indirect rule gave Nigerian officials considerable authority at local levels,
subject to British supervision; but Lugard’s constitution of 1914 gave
them practically no say in the regional or national councils of govern-
ment. Lawmaking was for the Governor-General alone. There was a
Legislative Council, whose assent was required to some laws – but for
Lagos only. The ‘Nigerian Council’, a national body which included a few
Nigerian chiefs, was advisory and deliberative only, and all its ‘unofficial’
members were appointed by the Governor-General in any case. Executive
power was concentrated in the Governor-General, his all-British
Executive Council, his British Lieutenant-Governors for North and
South, and all the officials of the British Colonial Service under them.
This arrangement was objected to by some Nigerians already in
1920. Not by Northern Muslims, but by Southerners – Christianised
and Western-educated – who throughout the colonial period led the
campaign for more say by Nigerians in government at the highest le-
vels, more democracy in the selection of those Nigerians who would
speak and act, more independence from British control, and the sooner
the better. In 1920 such demands – in this case for fully competent
Legislative Councils half composed of elected Africans, among others –
were made by the West African National Congress on behalf of all
Britain’s colonies in West Africa. Later, in Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwe
(from the East) and Obafemi Awolowo (from the West) came to the fore
as leaders of what became the independence struggle. Northern leaders,
with some exceptions, were never so anxious to see the British go.
The 1920 demands of the West African National Congress bore some
fruit in Nigeria, resulting in new constitutional arrangements which
took effect in 1922 and lasted until 1947 – longer than any other
Nigerian constitution to date. After 1947 constitutional change became
much more rapid. We can do no more here than summarise what in
lived history was a complex and fraught process of political modernisa-
tion and nation-building. For details the reader is referred to the various
works on Nigerian constitutional history, among the best of which are
Elias 1967 and Nwabueze 1982.
a. The Clifford Constitution, 1922. This established a new ‘Legislative
Council of Nigeria’, whose assent was required to certain laws. But a
majority of its members were colonial officials, and of the unofficial
members only four were elected (three from Lagos, one from Calabar),
the rest being appointed by the Governor (as the Governor-General was
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renamed in 1919). Furthermore its jurisdiction extended only to the
Southern Provinces and Lagos, the Governor alone retaining the power
to legislate for the North. The all-British Executive Council and the rest
of the apparatus of the colonial government remained in place.
b. The Richards Constitution, 1947. Pent-up demand for change,
Azikiwe and Awolowo to the fore, was released after the war; the then-
Governor, Sir Arthur Richards, had little choice but to make conces-
sions. Under the new constitution he put in place:
– New ‘Provincial Councils’ were established, one each for what were
now the Northern, Eastern and Western Provinces; these were the
first regional bodies on which Nigerians were represented, each
with majorities of ‘unofficial’ members largely selected by the
Native Authority Councils from among themselves. The Provincial
Councils were advisory and deliberative only, with an important ex-
ception: they each sent some of their unofficial members, selected
by themselves, onward to the central Legislative Council. In the
North a House of Chiefs was also established, which also sent some
of its members to the Legislative Council.
– The central Legislative Council for the first time was given nation-
wide jurisdiction and a majority of unofficial members. But still
only four of these were directly elected; the rest were nominated by
the Provincial Councils (16), the Northern House of Chiefs (4), or
the Governor (4). Meantime the old all-British central Executive
Council survived as before.
Several points are worth noting. (1) While Southern politicians were far
from satisfied with progress under the Richards Constitution, the
Northerners struggled to master the new ways and to think how they
would find enough qualified Northerners to fill all the posts that loom-
ing self-government would soon open up. (2) The tendency towards re-
gionalisation is clear; this became full-blown federalism in 1954. (3) Of
the twenty unofficial members of the new central Legislative Council
that were nominated by regional bodies, nine – almost half – came
from the North. This incipient predominance of the North in the na-
tional councils was in recognition of its predominance in size and more
especially in population, but it was a matter of grave concern in the
East and West.
c. The Macpherson Constitution, 1951. This was the first Nigerian con-
stitution drafted in a process which included Nigerians themselves,
starting with village, district and regional meetings, continuing with a
General Conference in Ibadan in January 1950, and culminating in de-
bates in the Provincial Councils, the Northern House of Chiefs, and the
central Legislative Council. The result was the new constitution promul-
gated in July 1951.
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– The three provinces were renamed regions. The Provincial Councils
became much-enlarged and mostly-elected regional Houses of
Assembly with real legislative authority. The Northern House of
Chiefs was also enlarged and given legislative powers, and the
Western Region got a House of Chiefs of its own. Regional
Executive Councils were formed, with majorities of ‘unofficial’
members, now called Ministers, drawn from the Houses of
Assembly and of Chiefs.
– At the centre, the Legislative Council became a much-enlarged and
mostly-elected House of Representatives, with wide authority to leg-
islate for the peace, order and good government of the whole country.
Members of this House were still not elected directly, but by the
Regional Houses of Assembly and of Chiefs from among them-
selves. The North was given as many elected members in the House
of Representatives as the East and West put together. The old central
Executive Council now became a Council of Ministers, with a major-
ity of Nigerian Ministers drawn from the House of Representatives.
d. The Lyttleton Constitution, 1954. The 1951 constitution was widely un-
derstood to be a stepping-stone towards fuller democracy and self-gov-
ernment. Several crises hastened both its demise and the tendency to-
wards a more robust federalism. One of these was precipitated in Lagos
in early 1953, at a sitting of the House of Representatives, when a dis-
cussion of the timing of Independence threw the House into an uproar.
The Northern standpoint – no definite date to be set yet – prevailed.
The Northern members were then roughly treated by mobs in Lagos
and all along their train-ride home, and a few weeks later serious fight-
ing, rooted in the trouble in Lagos, broke out between Hausas and
Igbos in Kano. This was the first major crisis of interethnic violence
since the British occupation; unfortunately it presaged much more of
the same to come. Northern leaders, much disturbed, seriously contem-
plated secession from Nigeria, but were deterred, it is said, by their lack
of access to the sea. The Northern House of Assembly instead de-
manded a new constitution giving the regions much more authority
and the central government practically none. Conferences in London
(1953) and Lagos (1954) resulted in a new constitution popularly named
after the then Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttleton:
– Nigeria officially became a federation of its three regions. Wide leg-
islative, executive, and judicial powers were transferred to the re-
gions; exclusive competence over a restricted list of subjects was re-
served for the federal government.
– ‘Official’ members almost completely disappeared from the regional
Houses of Assembly and the federal House of Representatives,
which, except in the North, were now elected directly; in the North
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‘electoral colleges’ based in the Native Authorities were still used ex-
cept in some urban areas. In all regions the members of the federal
House of Representatives were elected independently of the regio-
nal Houses of Assembly.
– Premiers were appointed in each region, from the party command-
ing a majority in the House of Assembly. The first Premiers were
Nnamdi Azikiwe in the East, Obafemi Awolowo in the West, and
Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto, in the North. The Premiers, re-
sponsible to the Houses of Assembly, took over the presidencies of
the regional Executive Councils from the British Governors when
regional self-government was achieved in 1957 (in the East and
West) and 1959 (in the North).
– New High Courts were established for each region, with judges ap-
pointed by the regional governments. The regional Houses of
Assembly were empowered to establish by law such other courts as
they deemed expedient.
– At the centre, most British officials were withdrawn from the
Council of Ministers in 1954; full Ministerial control, with a new
federal Prime Minister at the head of the government, was achieved
in 1957. The first Prime Minister was Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the
leader in the House of Representatives of the predominant
Northern political party, the Northern Peoples Congress. Tafawa
Balewa subsequently achieved international fame as the first leader
of independent Nigeria.
e. Constitutional Conferences in 1957 and 1958. The Lyttleton Constitution
of 1954 set the basic pattern of government which Nigeria was to take
into Independence. Important steps forward, some already noted, were
then taken at further constitutional conferences held in 1957 and 1958.
A new upper legislative chamber, the Senate, was added at the centre. It
was agreed that a Bill of Fundamental Human Rights, modelled on the
European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, would be included in
the Independence Constitution; the same basic provisions, from time to
time expanded, have appeared in every Nigerian constitution since.
Independence Day was set for the 1st of October, 1960, and other deci-
sions were taken, on revenue allocation, the procedure for creation of
new regions (‘states’) out of old should this be desired in the future,
and other matters. Independence was well on its way.
Change in the administration of Islamic law in the Northern Region
Few changes were made in the system of Native Courts between 1920
and 1954. The various grades of courts, each with its own jurisdiction
and powers, had already been established by statutes of 1906 and 1914.
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From 1906 appeals were allowed from courts of lower grades to the
Grade A courts of the emirs and chiefs. Until 1933 there were no ap-
peals outside the Native Court system: British control was through the
supervisory and quasi-appellate jurisdiction of the British administrative
officers. The only other form of control exercised by the British was
over the power of emir’s courts to pass death sentences, which were
made subject to review by the Governor. This was indirect rule, as ap-
plied to the Native Courts, at its height, involving, in the North, only
the most minimal interference by the British in the administration of
Islamic law.
This changed in 1933, when for the first time appeals were allowed
from the Native Courts to the British Magistrate’s and High Courts, a
move designed to integrate the native and British courts. But there was
an important exception:
No appellate authority other than a native court of appeal could
hear an appeal from a native court order relating to marriage, fa-
mily status, guardianship of children, inheritance, testamentary
disposition or administration of an estate (Keay & Richardson
1966: 39).
As the Native Courts also had exclusive original jurisdiction of such
cases, exclusive control of these ‘personal law’ matters was kept in the
hands of the Native Courts, a matter of particular concern to Northern
Muslims. All other matters, including criminal cases decided under
Islamic law, could and often did go on appeal to the British courts,
which thus now began to interfere in the administration of Islamic law
by the Muslim jurists best qualified to know it.
The unhappiness of the Northern ulama8 with this situation is indi-
cated by the fact that very soon after the regions were empowered (in
1954) to control their own court systems, the Northern House of
Assembly set up a new ‘Moslem Court of Appeal’, whose appellate jur-
isdiction extended to all cases, civil and criminal, decided under Islamic
law in the Native Courts. Appeals from the Native Courts in other cases
went to the regional High Court. The introduction of the Moslem Court
of Appeal ‘was welcomed by Chiefs and Moslem jurists as a means of
protecting Moslem law from encroachment as a result of appeal to
“English” courts’ (Keay & Richardson 1966: 56). But there were pro-
blems. The court had no permanent judges, but was merely constituted
as needed from panels of alkalis and assessors learned in Islamic law.
Moreover, Muslim suspicions of the High Court continued, because a
right of further appeal from the Moslem Court of Appeal to the High
Court was ‘rendered inevitable since jurisdiction [of the Moslem Court
of Appeal] extended to criminal matters’ (ibid).
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But with Independence fast approaching, pressures now came from
other directions which overtook these problems. Chief among them
were the fears of the non-Muslim minorities in the North – both indi-
genous peoples and Southern immigrants – about how they would be
dealt with when the British were gone and they were left at the mercy
of a powerful regional government and its Native Courts, dominated by
Muslims. This was one of many issues looked into by the so-called
Minorities Commission that was appointed after the 1957 constitutional
conference and which held extensive hearings throughout Nigeria in
the first half of 1958. In its lengthy report, submitted to the resumed
constitutional conference in 1958 (Report 1958), the Commission re-
jected the demands of minorities in all the regions for subdivision of
the country into more ‘states’ where some regional minorities could be-
come self-governing majorities; the process of state-creation only began
ten years later, on the eve of the Nigerian civil war. But the Minorities
Commission did recommend, as one form of protection for minorities
in all regions, the inclusion of a Bill of Fundamental Human Rights in
the Independence Constitution. As we have seen, this was done.
Many felt that more radical reform was needed in the North, particu-
larly in the matter of the continuing application there of Islamic crim-
inal law. In this respect Northern Nigeria was out of step even with the
rest of the Muslim world at the time:
[T]he case of Northern Nigeria was, indeed, almost unique, for
up till [1960] this was the only place outside the Arabian penin-
sula in which the Islamic law, both substantive and procedural,
was applied in criminal litigation – sometimes even in regard to
capital offences (Anderson 1976: 27).
The pressure to change this was intense.
If the fears of the considerable Christian and animist minorities
in the North were to be allayed, they needed to be assured that
Sharia law would not be imposed upon them in the native and
customary courts. [...] The Eastern and Western Regions were in-
sistent that the [...] law which was administered in any part of
the Federation [...] should respect the Fundamental Human
Rights of Nigerians as set out in the constitutional instruments.
[...] The U.N. Trusteeship Council had expressed reservations
about the capacity of an independent Federal Government in
Nigeria to uphold Fundamental Human Rights for the minori-
ties without a radical reform of the law in the Northern Region.
The British Government had made its position clear: reform of
the legal and judicial systems in the North was a necessary
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preliminary to the granting of self-government to the Region
(Richardson 2001: 2099).
The result of all this pressure was ‘The Settlement of 1960’ (Ostien
2006: 224-231), worked out and agreed to in general terms during 1958
and implemented in a spate of legislation all coming into operation on
30 September 1960, literally on the eve of Independence. Concluding
that the North should keep up with the pace set by the Eastern and
Western Regions in the race for independence, although it was less
‘ready’ than they, and that Northern independence, when it came,
should after all be in federation with the East and West, the North’s
Muslim ruling class agreed to reform the legal and judicial systems of
the Region, most notably by abrogating all the then-prevailing systems
of criminal law, including Islamic criminal law, in favour of new Penal
and Criminal Procedure Codes applicable in all courts of the Region to
all persons without regard to religious or ethnic affiliation. Islamic per-
sonal law, and other Islamic civil law, continued in force for application
in the Native Courts as appropriate, but parted company at the appellate
level. Cases involving Islamic personal law went to the new Sharia
Court of Appeal, whose jurisdiction was limited essentially to such
questions. Cases involving other Islamic civil law went to the new
Native Courts Appellate Division of the High Court. The Moslem Court
of Appeal was abolished. The judicial powers of the emirs were cur-
tailed; in subsequent years these powers were abolished completely.
These concessions were balanced, to some degree, by the new prestige
and privileges accorded to the Sharia Court of Appeal. It was made a
permanent court with a standing membership and given a status
equivalent to the Regional High Court. Its judgments, on matters with-
in its jurisdiction, were made final and unappealable to any other court.
Its jurisdiction was subject to extension beyond personal law matters, to
questions of other Islamic civil law, at the instance of the parties to par-
ticular cases. Perhaps most importantly, its judges were given a seat on
the Native Courts Appellate Division of the High Court, so that the
North’s Muslim jurists had a formal role in the application and develop-
ment of all the law applied in the Native Courts, not limited to Islamic
law. Beginning in 1959 and in the years following independence a huge
effort went into making these new arrangements work properly (Ostien
2007: I, 57-133); and until the Settlement of 1960 fell apart in 1979, it
seems that they actually did.
The First Republic
Under its Independence Constitution Nigeria became completely self-
governing, but it nevertheless remained a ‘part of Her Majesty’s
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dominions’. In practice this meant, for instance, that Nigeria’s
Governor-General and the Governors of the Regions ‘shall be appointed
by Her Majesty and shall hold office during Her Majesty’s pleasure and
[...] shall be Her Majesty’s representatives’ in their respective jurisdic-
tions; but the appointments were made, of course, on the advice of the
federal Prime Minister and the regional Premiers. Appeals still lay from
the Federal Supreme Court to the Privy Council. There were other
badges and incidents of the continuing monarchy. In 1963 it was
decided to do away with these vestiges and to convert Nigeria into a re-
public. Under the new constitution, which took effect on 1 October
1963, instead of ‘The Federation of Nigeria’ it became ‘The Federal
Republic of Nigeria’. The basic plan and most details of the constitution
remained unchanged. The first Governor-General of independent
Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwe, became the first President of the Republic.
Other high officials also remained in place.
Unfortunately things did not go smoothly for the new country. The
following brief summary may serve to give the uninitiated reader some
idea of the range of problems that arose.
The North-South and ethnic tensions, the politics of vindictive-
ness, oppression and thuggery, the Action Group crisis of 1962
[the party, rooted in the Western Region, split; after protracted
violence and rioting and the apparent collapse of government in
the Region the Federal Government declared a state of emer-
gency and the Region was ruled by a federal administrator for
about a year], revenue allocation disputes, the treason trials of
Chief Obafemi Awolowo and twenty other members of the
Action Group [accused of plotting to overthrow the Federal
Government by force], the census controversy of 1962-1964 [the
census, necessary to the allocation of seats in the House of
Representatives, attempted twice, figures never accepted], the
realignment of political parties before the 1964 federal elections
[leaving the main party of the Eastern Region, led by President
Azikiwe, in a weakened position], the 1964-1965 federal elec-
tions [boycotts in the East, violence, supplementary elections re-
quired], the dispute between the President and the Prime
Minister over the 1964 elections, the Western Nigeria elections
of 1965 and the civil violence that followed in the Region, con-
tributed in varying degrees to hasten the fall of the First
Republic and to the military takeover of January 1966 (Joye &
Igweike 1982: 38-39).
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13.3 The period from 1965 until 1985
Military coups, civil war, and the sharia debate of 1976-1978
Rule by the military, civil war, and the return to civilian rule
The military takeover proceeded in stages. On the night of 14-15 January
1966, a group of army majors, mostly Igbo by tribe, carried out coordi-
nated assassinations of the Premiers of the Northern and Western
Regions (Ahmadu Bello and Samuel Akintola), several other politicians,
and a number of fellow-officers from the North and West. They also kid-
napped and later killed the federal Prime Minister, Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa. The next day the majors declared their allegiance to the General
Officer Commanding, Major-General Aguiyi-Ironsi, also an Igbo but ap-
parently not involved in the initial plot. President Azikiwe was out of the
country at the time. On 16 January the Acting President, with the backing
of the Council of Ministers, handed over administration of the country to
the Armed Forces with Aguiyi-Ironsi at the head. The parts of the consti-
tution relating to the legislative and executive branches of the federal and
regional governments were suspended, the politicians were thrown out
of office, and Military Governors were appointed for each region.
Legislation thenceforward was by decree (federal) and edict (regional).
The courts continued to function more or less as before.
Besides being an Igbo, Aguiyi-Ironsi pursued some unpopular poli-
cies, including dissolution of the regions and transformation of Nigeria
into a unitary state. In July 1966, before this went very far in practice,
there was a second coup within the military, this time led by Northern
officers, in which Aguiyi-Ironsi and a number of other Igbo officers
were killed. A young Northerner, Lieutenant-Colonel (later General)
Yakubu Gowon, was installed as the new head of the Federal Military
Government, and the federation was restored. Subsequently, in many
parts of the North, there were pogroms against Igbos, precipitating a
massive migration of Igbos back to the East.
The situation finally descended into civil war in mid-1967. On 30
May, Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Ojukwu, the Military Governor
of the Eastern Region, declared the Region’s secession from the
Federation and its independence as a new nation under the name of
‘The Republic of Biafra’. When discussions aimed at reversing this de-
claration went nowhere, the Federal Military Government commenced
hostilities on 5 June. The war, which resulted in perhaps a million
deaths, mostly in the East, ended in 1970 with the defeat of Biafra and
its reincorporation into the country. Rule by the military continued.
One important by-product of the crises of 1966-1967 was the subdivi-
sion, so much talked of for such a long time, of Nigeria’s regions into
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smaller states. In May 1967, in a futile attempt to stave off Eastern se-
cession, General Gowon divided the country into twelve states, six of
them in the North. This exercise was repeated in 1976, when seven ad-
ditional states were created, four in the North. This process made the
formerly monolithic North, in particular, much more palatable to the
rest of the country. All the new states were legal clones of the regions
from which they came, the laws and institutions of the old regions be-
coming the laws and institutions of the new states carved out of them,
with much scrambling to staff all the new institutions thus created in
the new states. State-creation had important effects on the administra-
tion of Islamic law in the states of the ex-Northern Region, to which we
shall return shortly.
After the civil war General Gowon promised the early return of the
country to civilian rule. Fulfilment of this promise always seemed to be
put off, however, and, finally losing patience with the delays and with
the mounting corruption throughout the government, in July 1975 an-
other group from within the military deposed Gowon and replaced him
as head of state with General Murtala Mohammed. In addition to taking
drastic steps to combat corruption, Murtala quickly established a sche-
dule for transition to civilian rule, and took the first step: appointment
in late 1975 of a Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) charged with
preparing a new draft constitution for later consideration by a
Constituent Assembly. Murtala was assassinated in February 1976, in
yet another attempted coup from within the military, which this time
failed. Murtala’s successor was his second in command, General
Olusegun Obasanjo (who subsequently served as Nigeria’s elected presi-
dent from 1999 to 2007). Obasanjo stuck to Murtala’s transition sche-
dule, handing the country back to an elected civilian government on 1
October 1979, under the new-modelled constitution of 1979.
The 1979 constitution preserved the federal structure of Nigeria –
now with nineteen states plus the new Federal Capital Territory of
Abuja (the capital was finally moved from Lagos to Abuja in 1991). But
it made important changes in the system of government, the chief of
which was to switch from the Westminster style inherited from Britain
to a presidential system modelled on the United States. This change ex-
tended also to the state governments, so that in addition to an indepen-
dently-elected president for the federation, with extensive executive
powers laid down in the constitution, each state now also had an ‘execu-
tive governor’ elected independently of its House of Assembly. The new
constitution also entrenched local government reforms decreed by the
Military Government in 1976, guaranteeing a ‘system of local govern-
ment by democratically elected local government councils’ (Art. 7); this
was the final death-knell for emirate administration in the North. Many
other adjustments were made. All of Nigeria’s subsequent constitutions,
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including the 1999 constitution currently in effect, have been substan-
tially identical to the 1979 constitution, with variations only at the
margins.
The sharia debate of 1976-1978
The most contentious issue thrown up by the constitution-making pro-
cess of 1976-1978 is directly related to our main subject here: it was the
controversy over the proposal for a new Federal Sharia Court of Appeal.
The call for such an institution was a by-product of the state creation ex-
ercises of 1967 and 1976. As we have seen, each new state inherited
the laws and institutions of its parent region. In the North this meant
(among other things) that in place of the one original Sharia Court of
Appeal for the entire Region, there would now be, first six Sharia
Courts of Appeal, and then ten, one for each of the states into which
the Region was divided. All these new Sharia Courts of Appeal were le-
gal clones of the original one for the Region; hence the judgments of
each were final and unappealable to any other court. This raised the
problem the proposed Federal Sharia Court of Appeal was intended to
solve: the possibility of conflicts between the judgments of the Sharia
Courts of Appeal of the states. They would all be adjudicating on the
same class of cases – Islamic personal law. Inevitably cases involving
the same legal issue would come before the Sharia Courts of Appeal of
different states, and they would decide them differently, thus creating a
conflict. But since the judgments of each of the courts were final, any
conflict that might arise would be unresolveable. As early as 1972 it was
proposed to create a new Federal Sharia Court of Appeal that would sit
to hear appeals from the state Sharia Courts of Appeal and thus (among
other things) to resolve any conflicts that might crop up between them.
The CDC agreed with this proposal and included it in the draft constitu-
tion which it put before the country in 1976.
What happened is well known (Ostien 2006: 238-243 and authorities
cited). The Report of the CDC, including the draft constitution, was
published in September 1976 and became the subject of one year of
public discussion and analysis. In October 1977 a mostly-elected
Constituent Assembly convened to debate the CDC draft and to make
such amendments as it saw fit. In one year of discussion Christian opi-
nion on the Federal Sharia Court of Appeal had polarised and hardened,
and in the Constituent Assembly the Christian delegates ‘unleashed a
storm of protest’ against it (Hunwick 1992: 149). No compromise was
found possible in protracted debate. In the end it was the Christians
who had the votes, and in early April 1978, the Federal Sharia Court of
Appeal was officially eliminated from the constitution. The Muslim
members of the Constituent Assembly walked out the next day,
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maintaining their boycott for almost three weeks; only the intervention
of the Head of State (Obasanjo) persuaded them to return. The
Assembly then quickly wrapped up its work, adjourning finally on 5
June. After some further adjustments the constitution was officially en-
acted by a decree of 21 September 1978, to take effect on 1 October
1979.
State Sharia Courts of Appeal were indeed provided for, ‘for any
state that requires it’ (Art. 240(1)); this was balanced by also allowing
new Customary Courts of Appeal ‘for any State that requires it’, to
which appeals in cases decided under customary law might be directed
(Art. 245(1)). But the judgments of neither of these types of court were
any more final, even in the fields of Islamic or customary personal
law; all their judgments were made appealable to the federal Court of
Appeal and thence to the Supreme Court. Thus the long-standing right
of Muslim courts in the North to finally and autonomously decide all
issues of Islamic personal law was lost. The possibility of extending
Sharia Court of Appeal jurisdiction to questions of other Islamic civil
law at the instance of the parties to particular cases was also lost. The
right of judges of the Sharia Courts of Appeal to sit with judges of the
High Courts to decide all other appeals from the Native Courts was
also lost. In sum, the single high Muslim appellate court of days gone
by, with wide territorial jurisdiction, finality in its judgments, and a
voice in the decision of appeals by the High Court, was gone, replaced
by many lesser offspring: no longer even clones of the former
Regional Sharia Court of Appeal, they were lesser not only in their ter-
ritorial reach and in their dignity, but also in their jurisdiction, powers,
and autonomy. As the Muslims saw it, these new losses for Islamic
law in Nigeria were the result, not of a negotiated settlement volunta-
rily entered into by the Muslim leadership, as in 1960, but of a humi-
liating defeat at the hands of Nigeria’s Christians. As we shall see, var-
ious attempts were made in subsequent years, through the courts and
the constitution, to repair the damage, until finally, in 1999, Zamfara
State, seizing on a constitutional loophole, took the debate in a whole
new direction.
Return to military rule
Nigeria was governed under the 1979 constitution for only a little over
four years – 1979 to 1983. Shehu Shagari, elected president in 1979,
was re-elected in 1983; but on 31 December 1983 the military stepped in
once again, once again promising to clean up rampant corruption.
General Muhammadu Buhari was installed as the new head of state,
large parts of the constitution were suspended as before, and the coun-
try was ruled by decree and edict for the next sixteen years.
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13.4 The period from 1985 until the present
Return to civilian rule at last; sharia implementation in twelve
northern states
Constitutional developments
General Buhari is famous for his ‘War Against Indiscipline’, including
the military tribunals he set up to pursue the recovery of public prop-
erty looted during the Shagari era and to prosecute those who had sto-
len it. Many politicians were arrested and languished in prison awaiting
trial; those tried and convicted were sentenced to serve long terms. But
the tribunals became notorious for their arbitrary and highhanded beha-
viour, to the point that the Nigerian Bar Association instructed its mem-
bers not to appear before them. Buhari’s initial popularity faded as he
resorted to ever more drastic methods to stifle criticism. It is said that
the last straw was a threatened investigation into contracts awarded by
the Ministry of Defence, which if pursued would have implicated senior
military officers (Alli 2001). However that may be, in August 1985
Buhari was deposed by yet another coup from within the military, and
replaced by General Ibrahim Babangida.
Babangida, like Murtala Mohammed a decade earlier, laid down a
schedule for return of the country to civilian rule, complete with an-
other Constituent Assembly convened (1988) to revise the 1979 consti-
tution. But the last stage of Babangida’s transition programme, the pre-
sidential election of 1993, was botched, and the country fell back into
the hands of the military, this time under its worst tyrant to date,
General Sani Abacha. Under the reign of Abacha (1993-1998), Nigeria
drifted deeper into a morass of crime, corruption, and violence, result-
ing in its increasing international isolation. The 1995 hanging of hu-
man rights activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his companions, by or-
ders of Abacha, led to widespread international condemnation. Nigeria
was suspended as a member of the British Commonwealth and was tar-
geted by economic sanctions imposed by the European Union among
others. Abacha too announced a schedule for return of the country to ci-
vilian rule, convening yet another Constitutional Conference (1994-
1995) for revision of the constitution, but he died in office before his
sincerity on this point was tested.
Abacha died in June 1998. His successor was Major-General
Abdulsalami Abubakar. Although Abubakar initially lacked even a modi-
cum of support or legitimacy, and people feared for a continuation of
the military dictatorship, he quickly took decisive steps towards the re-
covery of the Nigerian democracy (Nzeh 2002: 40-41). He released poli-
tical prisoners, the international sanctions were lifted, and what many
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consider to be Nigeria’s freest and fairest elections ever were held, to all
local, state, and federal offices. On 29 May 1999, power was transferred
to the new state governors and the new president, Olusegun Obasanjo.
The 1999 constitution, which came into force the same day and under
which the country is still governed, was essentially the 1979 constitu-
tion reinstated.
Nigeria is now continuing its longest period of uninterrupted civilian
rule since Independence. Elections were held as scheduled in 2003;
Obasanjo was returned to power for another four years. Elections were
again held as scheduled in 2007. Although these elections were widely
condemned as badly flawed, the presidency changed hands peacefully
for the first time in Nigeria’s history, and election tribunals, convened
according to constitutional processes, have dealt with the irregularities
apparently unswayed by political considerations. The new president,
Umaru Yar’Adua of Katsina State, has pledged himself and his govern-
ment to respect and enforce the rule of law.
Sharia and national law, 1985-present
The collapse of the Settlement of 1960 in the constitution-making pro-
cess of 1976-1978 has been described. In the twenty years between
1979 and 1999 two types of attempts were made by Muslims to repair
the damage. (1) A new field of constitutional litigation was opened up,
focussed on the Sharia Courts of Appeal. New pressure had been put
on Sharia Court of Appeal jurisdiction because judges of the Sharia
Courts of Appeal no longer sat on the Appellate Division of the High
Court. This meant that Muslims litigating, for instance, contract, tort,
or land cases under Islamic law in the Area Courts (successors in the
North to the Native Courts), who wanted specifically Muslim jurists to
examine the matter on appeal, had no choice but to try for the Sharia
Courts of Appeal. But the trouble now was that the possibility of extend-
ing Sharia Court of Appeal jurisdiction to such cases at the instance of
the parties had been cut off; this was what a succession of cases held
(Ostien 2006: 243-244). (2) The constitution being against them, the
Muslims turned their attention to amending the constitution. The first
attempt, decreed by General Babangida in 1986, deleted the word ‘per-
sonal’ wherever it occurred after the word ‘Islamic’ in the sections of
the 1979 constitution touching on Sharia Court of Appeal jurisdiction.
This theoretically should have done the trick, but the courts held other-
wise, finding the amendment to be ‘of no jurisdictional consequence
and in practical terms [to have] achieved nothing’ (ibid: 244-245).
Under the Babangida and Abacha constitutions, the crucial section was
therefore redrafted and simplified, unequivocally extending the jurisdic-
tion of the Sharia Courts of Appeal to all ‘civil proceedings involving
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questions of Islamic law where all the parties are Muslims’; but neither
the Babangida nor the Abacha constitution ever came into force. When
General Abubakar returned Nigeria to civilian rule in 1999, he disre-
garded the Babangida and Abacha constitutions almost entirely, simply
reinstating the 1979 constitution (with some amendments not affecting
our point here). The position looked hopeless.
It was at this point that Alhaji Ahmad Sani came into the picture.
Sani was elected Governor of Zamfara State in the governorship elec-
tions held on 9 January 1999 – the first such elections after sixteen
years of military rule. Zamfara State, in Nigeria’s far north, has a predo-
minantly rural population of about three million, of which 90 per cent
or more are Muslim. Governor Sani was its first elected governor, the
state only having been created (out of Sokoto State) in a new round of
state-creation decreed by Sani Abacha in 1996. Governor Sani says that
during his campaign,
In any town I went to, I first started with kafaral, which is chant-
ing Allahu Akbar10 thrice. Then I always said, ‘I am in the race
not to make money, but to improve on our religious way of wor-
ship, and introduce religious reforms that will make us get
Allah’s favour. And then we will have abundant resources for de-
velopment’ (Tell Magazine, 15 November 1999: 19).
This promise was little noticed outside Zamfara during the campaign.
But after his inauguration on 29 May 1999, Governor Sani proceeded
to make it good – at least as to the religious reforms – and thus began a
new chapter in the history of Nigeria’s Muslims and of their relations
with their non-Muslim neighbours and compatriots.
‘Religious reforms that will make us get Allah’s favour’. By this
Governor Sani did not mean reforms of the religion, of Islam. He
meant reforms of the laws and institutions of Zamfara State, to bring
them more into conformity with Islam – in particular with Islamic law.
‘Sharia implementation’, as the reforms quickly came to be called, has
been effected primarily by legislation at the state and local government
levels, aimed at making the legislating jurisdictions, in various ways,
more ‘sharia compliant’ than they had formerly been. After Zamfara
showed the way, eleven other states – Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa,
Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto and Yobe – followed with
similar legislative programmes. Here is a summary of what has been
done:
– The principal point conceded by the Muslims in the Settlement of
1960 – the abrogation of Islamic criminal law – has been re-
claimed. Relying on their constitutional power to legislate on crim-
inal matters, and their constitutional right to freely practice their
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religion, all sharia states have reinstated Islamic criminal law, in
the form of new Sharia Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes applic-
able to Muslims.
– Relying on their constitutional power to regulate their own court
systems, all sharia states have established inferior Sharia Courts,
with original jurisdiction to apply the full range of Islamic law, civil
and criminal, to Muslims.
– Seizing on an anomalous clause in the constitutional language de-
fining Sharia Court of Appeal jurisdiction – until 1999 little noticed
– all sharia states have extended the jurisdiction of their Sharia
Courts of Appeal to all matters, civil and criminal, decided in the in-
ferior Sharia Courts. This move simply bypassed all the litigation
relating to Sharia Court of Appeal jurisdiction, and all the at-
tempted constitutional amendments, of the previous twenty years.
– A wide range of other legislation has been enacted aimed at particu-
lar ‘social vices’ and ‘un-Islamic behaviour’, like the consumption of
alcohol, gambling, prostitution, unedifying media, and the excessive
mixing together of unrelated males and females. Two states –
Zamfara and Kano – uniquely among all Nigerian states – have
even tackled the pan-Nigerian problem of corruption, setting up
their own statutory Public Complaints and Anti-Corruption
Commissions in accordance with Islamic principles.
– Other institutions have been established – Sharia Commissions and
Councils of Ulama with important advisory and executive functions;
boards for the collection and distribution zakat11; hisbah12 organisa-
tions to monitor and try to enforce sharia compliance, but also to
engage in mediation and conciliation within the society; and others;
– all with the aim of deepening and enforcing the application of
sharia law in the lives of the Muslims of the states that have estab-
lished them.
Not all the sharia states have done all of these things, and what has
been done has been done differently from state to state. Still, taken to-
gether, these interlocking measures – in theory at any rate – have re-
stored the application of Islamic law to Muslims, in the states that have
enacted them, to a state of completeness and a degree of autonomy
from the ‘English’ legal system, that it has not had for over a century.
In practice, of course, things have not always worked out as hoped.
Extensive documentation of what has been done can be found in Ostien
2007.
Governor Sani’s announcement of his sharia implementation pro-
gramme exhilarated Nigeria’s Muslims, and produced tremendous pres-
sure on the governments of other northern states to follow suit. But it
aroused fear and loathing among Christians, who expected the worst;
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civil war was even predicted by some (Barends 2003: 19; Ostien 2002:
172-73). Everyone’s worst fears seemed to be confirmed by the first am-
putation of a hand for theft already in March 2000, and then by the
stoning cases of Safiyatu Hussaini (2001-2002) and Amina Lawal
(2002-2003), which caused an uproar around the world.13 In Nigeria
serious fighting, killing and destruction of property, sparked off directly
by agitation for and against sharia implementation, did break out, in
Kaduna State, in February 2000, leaving hundreds, perhaps thousands,
dead. Subsequent lesser outbreaks of violence elsewhere in the North,
in the first year or two after sharia implementation started, perhaps re-
sulted from it in part, and in part from all the other causes of inter-reli-
gious and inter-ethnic strife that have rankled for many years (see e.g.
Boer 2003; Ostien 2009). Since those early days, however, the clamour
has died down completely, to the point that sharia implementation was
a non-issue, virtually never mentioned, in the state and federal election
campaigns of 2007. Some of the reasons for this will be discussed
below.
It remains to mention the ‘Independent Sharia Panels’ (ISPs) estab-
lished in the South in the wake of sharia implementation in the North.
As we have seen, there has never been any state-sanctioned application
of Islamic law in the South. With no chance of changing this through
legislation, Muslims in several southern cities (e.g. Lagos, Ibadan, and
Ijebu-Ode) have set up what amount to private arbitration panels, to ap-
ply Islamic law in the settlement of disputes submitted to them by par-
ties consenting to their jurisdiction and agreeing to abide by their judg-
ments. These panels have gained recognition and status through the in-
volvement of such national bodies as the Supreme Council for Islamic
Affairs and the Supreme Council for Sharia in Nigeria. Intended pri-
marily to resolve private disputes, especially in the field of personal and
family law, the panels have sometimes also been drawn reluctantly into
application of the penal law as well. In one famous case a self-confessed
fornicator submitted himself to the ISP in his city, demanding the hu-
dud punishment for his sin. Evidently never having been married, he
was duly given his one hundred strokes of the cane. One wonders what
would have happened had he been a married man.14 Whether the
courts would enforce the judgments of the ISPs, if asked to do so, is
not known.
13.5 Constitutional law
In this section we deal with sharia-related matters arising under articles
of Nigeria’s constitution other than those on Fundamental Rights,
which are dealt with in section 13.9. As much of the discussion, here
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and in section 13.9, pertains to various details of the new programmes
of sharia implementation, it should be remarked at the outset that sha-
ria implementation in northern Nigeria was not done in defiance of the
constitution. In most sharia states, before they did anything, the gover-
nors appointed ‘Sharia Implementation Committees’ charged among
other things to ‘study what steps should be taken [and] to consider the
constitutionality of the measures proposed’ (Ostien 2007: II, 3). Then,
in announcing their programmes, the governors explicitly acknowl-
edged the supremacy of the federal constitution and laws. Governor
Sani of Zamfara State said from the beginning that ‘[w]hatever I am
doing must be [...] within the agreement signed by the people of
Nigeria to live together which is referred to as the Constitution’
(Nigerian Guardian, 6 December 1999: 69). Governor Kure of Niger
State said that sharia law as implemented in his state would
submit to the supremacy of the nation’s constitution. […] [H]e as-
sured that where the system ran contrary to the provisions of
the constitution, shari’a would bow to give the constitution the
right of way. [...] He said that having vowed to preserve and pro-
tect the nation’s constitution during his swearing in, his admin-
istration would do nothing to flout the provisions under any
guise (Nigerian Guardian, 17 January 2000: 71).
Many other examples could be given. ‘The Muslims of northern Nigeria
are saying that they want to implement as much of their law as they
possibly can within the constitution and laws of the federation. That at-
titude is entirely politically correct’ (Ostien 2002: 167). The question re-
mains, of course, whether the sharia implementation programmes, or
any of them, do in any way go outside the bounds of the constitution
and laws of the federation. Various aspects of this question are dealt
with in the rest of this section and in section 13.9.
Sharia in Nigeria’s constitution
Sharia finds its place in Nigeria’s 1999 constitution only in a number
of provisions relating to the Sharia Courts of Appeal of the Federal
Capital Territory and of ‘any State that requires it’; in fact, eighteen of
the nineteen states of the ex-Northern Region have Sharia Courts of
Appeal, the nineteenth, Benue State, sharing with Plateau. The constitu-
tion provides in detail for their establishment, the appointment and re-
moval of their judges (since 1979 denominated ‘kadis’ in the constitu-
tion and laws), their jurisdiction, appeals from their judgments, and
other matters relating to them (Chapter VII, on the judicature). For
most purposes the Sharia Courts of Appeal are grouped with the
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Supreme Court, the federal Court of Appeal, the state and federal High
Courts, and the Customary Courts of Appeal. Thus, they are superior
courts of record (Art. 6). The salaries of their kadis are set by the
National Assembly and paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund of
the federation (Art. 84). Their Grand Kadis (chief judges) may adminis-
ter the oaths of office taken by state governors (Art. 185). Their Grand
Kadis also serve on the National Judicial Council and the State Judicial
Service Commissions, and all kadis may be (and many are) appointed
to serve on Election Tribunals (IIId and VIth Scheds.). The Sharia
Courts of Appeal and their kadis are familiar and accepted features of
Nigeria’s judicial landscape.
The existence of Sharia Courts of Appeal implies the existence of
courts inferior to them in which Islamic law is applied and from which
appeals to them may be taken. These were the North’s Native Courts,
which in 1967-1968 were reconstituted as ‘Area Courts’. As we have
seen, from 1960 the parts of Islamic law applied in these courts was
limited to Islamic personal law and other Islamic civil law, Islamic crim-
inal law having been abrogated. All appeals involving Islamic personal
law went to the Sharia Courts of Appeal. Most appeals involving other
Islamic civil law went to the High Courts until 1979, and all did there-
after. Since 1999-2000, in the twelve sharia states, the inferior courts
in which Islamic law is applied have been reorganised once again: the
Area Courts have been abolished and replaced by ‘Sharia Courts’,
charged to apply the full range of Islamic law, civil and criminal, to
Muslims. Appeals from the Sharia Courts in all types of cases have
been directed to the Sharia Courts of Appeal.
Establishment of inferior Sharia Courts
The states may establish, below their superior courts, ‘such other courts
as may be authorised by law to exercise jurisdiction at first instance or
on appeal on matters with respect to which a House of Assembly may
make laws’, and any court a House of Assembly can establish it can also
abolish (Art. 6). Thus in the sharia states the Area Courts have come
and gone and the Sharia Courts have replaced them. (This involved lit-
tle change of personnel: most of the Area Court judges simply became
Sharia Court alkalis.) Like the Area Courts before them, the Sharia
Courts have criminal as well as civil jurisdiction, now to apply the new
Sharia Penal Codes (see 13.7), as the Area Courts applied the Penal
Code before. With all of this per se there appears to be no constitutional
problem.
But there are problems with some provisions of the new Sharia
Courts laws. Administrative responsibility for the Area Courts (and of
the Native Courts before them) was in the hands of the Chief Judges of
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the High Courts. Now, in the sharia states, administrative responsibility
for the Sharia Courts has been transferred to the Grand Kadis of the
Sharia Courts of Appeal. Some of the Chief Judges have objected, re-
senting, perhaps, their loss of jurisdiction, and citing their ex officio
chairmanship of the state Judicial Service Commissions, mandated by
the constitution (IIId Sched. Pt. II C). This is perhaps not very convin-
cing; nevertheless, as of October 2009, transfer of control from the
Chief Judge to the Grand Kadi has yet to be accomplished in two sharia
states (Borno and Katsina).
A more serious constitutional question is raised by the direction of
all appeals from the Sharia Courts, in criminal as well as civil matters,
to the Sharia Courts of Appeal, cutting out the High Courts completely.
We consider this point next.
Expansion of Sharia Court of Appeal jurisdiction
Article 277 of Nigeria’s constitution provides as follows (italics added):
277. (1) The Sharia Court of Appeal of a State shall, in addition
to such other jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by the law of
the State, exercise such appellate and supervisory jurisdiction in
civil proceedings involving questions of Islamic personal law
which the court is competent to decide in accordance with the
provisions of subsection (2) of this section.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) of this section, the Sharia
Court of Appeal shall be competent to decide
(a) )
[specified questions of Islamic personal law, e.g. marriage,
divorce, guardianship, inheritance, etc.]
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e) – [any other question of Islamic personal law at the instance
of Muslim parties to particular cases]
The question is whether subsection (2) lays down the maximum juris-
diction any Sharia Court of Appeal can have, or whether it lays down
the minimum only, the states being free, under the italicised clause of
subsection (1), to add any further jurisdiction they please. If the former,
then the sharia states, by expanding the jurisdiction of their Sharia
Courts of Appeal to matters well outside the bounds of Islamic personal
law, have acted unconstitutionally. If the latter, then the sharia states
have found a brilliant bypass to the constitutional roadblock, set up in
1979, which the North’s Muslims then spent twenty years trying to
remove.
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If Article 277 is read by itself, the position of the sharia states looks
strong. If it is read in the light of its history and of the rest of constitu-
tion, the position looks much weaker. Article 277 entered the constitution
as Article 242 of the 1979 constitution, in identical terms except for a
small difference in the wording of subsection (2)(e). There is no question
but that the drafters of the 1979 constitution intended to limit Sharia
Court of Appeal jurisdiction to questions of Islamic personal law only,
and that the insertion of the italicised clause of subsection (1) was a
draftsman’s error that somehow escaped detection (Ostien 2006: 248-
252). The other articles of the constitution dealing with the Sharia Courts
of Appeal relentlessly use the phrase ‘Islamic personal law’. To take just
one example, the class of cases in which appeals lie from the Sharia
Courts of Appeal to the federal Court of Appeal is defined as ‘civil pro-
ceedings before the Sharia Court of Appeal with respect to any question
of Islamic personal law which the Sharia Court of Appeal is competent to
decide’ (Art. 244(1)); but it cannot have been the intention to leave unap-
pealable other types of questions that the state Houses of Assembly, if
they were allowed, might empower their Sharia Courts of Appeal to de-
cide. The High Courts of two states have already held that expansion of
Sharia Court of Appeal jurisdiction beyond questions of Islamic personal
law is unconstitutional.15 In those states the old pattern has returned,
appeals from the Sharia Courts in Islamic personal law cases going to
the Sharia Courts of Appeal, appeals in all other cases going to the
High Courts. More of the same is likely as time goes on.
Enactment of other elements of the sharia implementation programmes
Article 4(7) of the constitution provides that:
The House of Assembly of a State shall have power to make laws
for the peace, order and good government of the State or any part
thereof with respect to the following matters, that is to say
(a) any matter not included in the Exclusive Legislative List
[…];
(b) any matter included in the Concurrent Legislative List […]
to the extent prescribed [therein];
(c) any other matter with respect to which it is empowered to
make laws in accordance with the provisions of this
Constitution.
We consider briefly the authority of the sharia states under this provi-
sion to enact four other elements of their sharia implementation
programmes.
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a. Criminal law. The power to create and punish criminal offences is
vested in both the state and federal governments in Nigeria, within
their respective spheres of authority (IId Sched. Pt. III(2)). Thus the
Penal Codes in force in all northern states are state enactments. There
are of course limitations. No legislative body has power, ‘in relation to
any criminal offence whatsoever, […] to make any law which shall have
retrospective effect’ (Art. 4(9)). Every criminal offence must be ‘defined
and the penalty therefore […] prescribed in a written law’, i.e. ‘an Act of
the National Assembly or a Law of a State [or] any subsidiary legislation
or instrument under the provisions of a law’ (Art. 36(12)). The new
Sharia Penal Codes enacted by the sharia states comply with these
broad requirements, except in one particular. Seven of the codes contain
(with minor variations) the following provision, captioned ‘General
offences’:
Any act or omission which is not specifically mentioned in this
Sharia Penal Code but is otherwise declared to be an offence un-
der the Qur’an, Sunnah, and ijtihad of the Maliki school of
Islamic thought, shall be an offence under this code and such
act or omission shall be punishable: (a) with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to five years, or (b) with caning which
may extend to 50 lashes, or (c) with a fine which may extend to
N5,000.00 [about E 2216], or with any two of the above punish-
ments (Ostien 2007: IV, 60 n.e 118).
This incorporation by reference of otherwise undefined offences no
doubt violates Art. 36(12), and would be struck down if challenged in a
proper case. The other constitutional questions raised by the Sharia
Penal Codes relate not to the power of the sharia states to enact them,
but to issues of fundamental rights considered in section 13.9 below.
b. Evidence. Since 1979 the subject of evidence has been on the con-
stitutional Exclusive Legislative List (IId Sched. Pt. I §23), and therefore
presumptively reserved for the National Assembly alone; and there is a
federal Evidence Act, in force in Nigeria with few changes since 1945.
At the same time, the North’s Area Courts, and presumably the South’s
Customary Courts as well, have continued to apply, as the case may be,
Islamic or ‘native and customary’ rules of procedure and evidence in ci-
vil matters coming before them, without regard to the Evidence Act;
and now the new Sharia Courts are doing the same in criminal matters
as well. Can this be correct?
As to civil matters there is clearly no problem. The Evidence Act by
its own terms is inapplicable ‘to judicial proceedings in any civil cause
or matter in or before any Sharia Court of Appeal, Customary Court of
Appeal, Area Court or Customary Court’ (§1(2)(c)). It may be presumed
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that the term ‘Area Court’ will be read to include the new Sharia Courts
as well. This exemption recognises the continuing duality of Nigeria’s
court systems and the continuing applicability, in the latter-day ‘native’
courts, of Islamic law and native law and custom, including the law and
custom relating to procedure and evidence.
Criminal matters are a different question. The Evidence Act says that
the North’s Area Courts (we presume Sharia Courts are included), in
criminal causes or matters, are to be guided by its provisions, except that
they are bound by six specific sections all relating to burden of proof (§1
(3) and (4)). This distinction, between being guided and being bound,
entered the law of the Northern Region in 1960, supposedly on an ‘in-
terim’ basis, while the judges of the Native Courts became accustomed
to the new Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes and the Evidence Act,
all very different from the law they had been accustomed to applying up
till then (Ostien 2007: I, 63-65 and IV, 181-182). But the distinction has
persisted until the present, and has even been perpetuated in some of
the new Sharia Criminal Procedure Codes enacted in the sharia states
(Ostien 2007: IV, 195-197). Whether the principle of guidance, as used
in §1(3) of the Evidence Act, leaves room for the application, in criminal
cases in the Sharia Courts, of Islamic rules of evidence which are some-
times inconsistent with the Act, is a complex question on which we can-
not enter further here.
c. Zakat. ‘Taxation of incomes, profits and capital gains’ is on the
Exclusive Legislative List (IId Sched. Pt. I §59). But eleven of the sharia
states have set up official agencies for the collection and distribution of
zakat, the Islamic ‘alms’ tax (see note 11). In most states payment re-
mains voluntary, but in three defaulters can be prosecuted, and in one
other zakat can be recovered as a civil debt. Zakat is a tax on wealth.
The levy of zakat on their wealthy Muslims by the sharia states, if it is
ever challenged, seems unlikely to be held inconsistent with the federal
government’s exclusive prerogative to tax incomes, profits and capital
gains.
d. The hisbah groups. ‘Police and other government security services
established by law’ are also on the Exclusive Legislative List (IId Sched.
Pt. I §45), and Art. 214(1) makes the point very clear:
There shall be a Police Force for Nigeria, which shall be known
as the Nigeria Police Force, and […] no other police force shall
be established for the Federation or any part thereof.
But seven of the sharia states have set up official hisbah organisations
(see note 12) (in other states hisbah groups have organised themselves
as NGOs), which, along with preaching, admonishing, and a good deal
of mediation and conciliation, also do what looks like policing –
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monitoring and trying to enforce sharia compliance. This has some-
times brought them into conflict with members of the public and with
the police, particularly in Kano, where hisbah attempts to enforce bans
on commercial motorcycles carrying female passengers resulted in late
2005 in serious clashes between hisbah, motorcycle drivers, and police
(Nasir 2007: 110-111). Things came to a head in February 2006, when
the federal government accused the Kano hisbah of being an illegal po-
lice force, purported to ban it, and arrested its Commander and his dep-
uty, charging them with three counts of felonious membership and
management of an unlawful society (Nigerian Guardian, 10 February
2006: 1). In response, two lawsuits against the federal government were
promptly filed: Kano State sued in the Supreme Court, seeking a de-
claration that its hisbah organisation was legal, and the Commander
and his deputy sued in the Federal High Court, seeking damages for
unlawful arrest and illegal detention. The Supreme Court case was in-
conclusive: the court dismissed it as not within its original jurisdiction
and said it should be refiled, if at all, in the Federal High Court (it
never was). Kano was the clear winner in the other two cases: the hisbah
Commander and his deputy were acquitted of the criminal charges, and
in their own suit for illegal detention they won N500,000 (about
E 2,222) each.17 The Kano and other hisbah organisations are still very
much in business.
The ‘state religion’ question
Article 10 of Nigeria’s constitution provides that ‘The Government of
the Federation or of a State shall not adopt any religion as State
Religion.’ Have the sharia states, or any of them, violated this provi-
sion? This is a difficult question, because the measures taken differ sig-
nificantly from state to state, most importantly in the scope of ‘imple-
mentation of sharia’ attempted, and also because no Nigerian court –
certainly not the Supreme Court – has yet interpreted or applied Article
10 in any concrete case, so that one does not know what test the courts
will use to determine whether a particular enactment or combination of
enactments amounts to adoption of a state religion within the meaning
of Article 10. Nevertheless, it is possible to say something on this point,
at least in a negative sense: Article 10 does not imply a regime of strict
separation between religion and state such as that obtaining in the
United States and some other countries (Ostien & Gamaliel 2002). Its
language is not so sweeping as the U.S. ‘establishment clause’, for in-
stance;18 and other parts of Nigeria’s constitution, some mentioned al-
ready, imply a degree of accommodation, cooperation, and even of en-
tanglement between religion and state that would be unimaginable in
the U.S. For instance, Article 38(2), part of the fundamental rights
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provision on freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, clearly per-
mits religious instruction to be given and religious ceremonies and ob-
servances to be conducted in the public schools, all of which is done
everywhere in Nigeria but is strictly prohibited in the U.S. Articles 6,
247, 275-279, and 288, all touching on the Sharia Courts of Appeal,
clearly permit the enforcement of at least large parts of the sharia in the
public courts. The provisions on the Sharia Courts of Appeal bring out
another point: Article 10 does not require even that all religious groups
be treated identically by the state. The case of religion in the public
schools obscures this, since Muslims and Christians both want it and
both get it on equal terms. But they do not both want to live under their
own religious law: only the Muslims want that, and under Nigeria’s con-
stitution they may to a large extent have it: Article 10, read in the light
of Articles 6, 247, 275-279, and 288, permits the state and federal gov-
ernments to accommodate them in particular in this way. But whether
any or all of the sharia states have gone too far with their sharia imple-
mentation programmes, passing beyond the bounds permitted by
Article 10, remains, until the Nigerian courts clarify what Article 10
means, a moot point (Peters 2003: 45).
13.6 Personal status, family, and inheritance law
This part of the law – ‘personal law’, to use the term often applied – is
extremely complex, or should we say ‘plural’, in Nigeria.
Under the constitution, the federal government has the exclusive
right to regulate ‘the formation, annulment and dissolution of mar-
riages other than marriages under Islamic law and customary law includ-
ing matrimonial causes relating thereto’ (IId Sched. Pt. I §61, italics
added). Accordingly there is a federal (originally English) Marriage Act
dating from the colonial period, and a federal (also substantially
English) Matrimonial Causes Act dating from 1970, the latter having re-
placed the prior rule that in matrimonial causes the courts should sim-
ply proceed ‘in conformity with the law and practice for the time being
in force in England’. Marriages under the Marriage Act must be offi-
cially registered. Matrimonial causes must be litigated in the High
Courts.
But most marriages by far, and most dissolutions of marriage, and
most issues closely related to marriage such as guardianships, child
custody and, particularly for women, personal status and property
rights, are governed not by the federal statutes at all, but by Islamic law
or customary law. Islamic law is the classical Maliki fiqh,19 with all its fa-
miliar features; customary law is as multifarious as are Nigeria’s many
ethnic groups. But in truth it is heterogeneous amalgams, of Islamic
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law with local custom, or of one set of customs with another, which are
in practice applied; and none of it is codified. Administration is often
informal, by family, clan, or community elders; few of the proceedings,
including marriages and divorces, are officially recorded anywhere. If it
comes to that, litigation is in the local Sharia, Area, or (in the southern
states) the Customary Courts.
The constitution leaves regulation of inheritance entirely to the states.
In all states there are statutes, again derived from English law, governing
testate and intestate succession. These interact in various ways with the
Marriage Act and with Islamic and customary law. Thus, for instance,
the inheritance statutes usually apply only if one is married under the
Marriage Act; but even if one is, one’s power to dispose of property even
by will may be limited by Islamic or customary law (Ezeilo undated: 3).
But again, because most people are not married under the Marriage Act,
most estates by far are disposed of, usually informally but sometimes
through the local courts, under Islamic and/or customary law.
We have noted that in Nigeria’s southern states Islamic personal law
has never ousted customary personal law even among the Muslims
(perhaps the new Independent Sharia Panels will begin to change that);
so in practice it is only in the northern states that Islamic personal law
is formally applied, in the Sharia Courts of the sharia states and in the
Area Courts of other northern states in cases involving Muslims. The
Area Courts also apply the appropriate customary personal law in cases
involving non-Muslims, and there are statutory choice-of-law rules for
‘mixed’ cases.
As to non-Muslims in the sharia states, who might wish their own
customary law to be applied in the adjudication of their disputes, the si-
tuation has become confused – the Area Courts, which used to apply
customary law, having been abolished, the new Sharia Courts having
jurisdiction to apply Islamic law only, and the Magistrate’s and High
Courts having historically been excluded from original jurisdiction of
personal law matters arising under ‘native law and custom’. In some
places non-Muslims are nevertheless quietly being catered for in the
Sharia Courts, the alkalis applying local customary law as if they were
still the Area Court judges that most of them used to be. In other places
the Magistrate’s Courts come in, although their jurisdiction to do so too
is questionable.
In the sharia states, appeals from the Sharia Courts should all go to
the Sharia Courts of Appeal: it is anybody’s guess what would happen
to an appeal by a non-Muslim whose divorce or inheritance case had
been decided by the alkali under customary law. In the non-sharia
northern states, appeals from the Area Courts go to the Sharia Courts
of Appeal in cases decided under Islamic personal law and to the High
Courts or the Customary Courts of Appeal in cases decided under
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customary personal law. All appeals from the Magistrate’s Courts go to
the High Courts. High Court decisions have always been appealable
further to the federal Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme Court,
and similarly, since 1979, for decisions of the Sharia and Customary
Courts of Appeal. The federal appellate courts both therefore do some-
times decide questions of Islamic and customary personal law.
The old patriarchies remain strong all over Nigeria, and accordingly
much personal law and custom is skewed in favour of men. Many girls
are married off at young ages to much older men, sometimes against
their will (in Muslim cases, under the Maliki doctrine of ijbar, the over-
ruling power of the father or guardian to act purely (theoretically) in the
girl’s best interest). Polygamy is lawful and remains common in all
parts of the country under both Islamic and customary law. Purdah20 is
widely practiced among northern Muslims. Physical abuse of wives by
their husbands is tolerated and even protected: §55(1)(d) of the Penal
Codes of all northern states, now perpetuated in the new Sharia Penal
Codes as well, provides that:
Nothing is an offence which does not amount to the infliction of
grievous hurt upon any person and which is done [...] by a hus-
band for the purpose of correcting his wife.
Divorce is everywhere easier for men than for women (including the
unfettered privilege of talak21 for Muslim men), so they do it more of-
ten, and sometimes evade their putative obligations to wives and chil-
dren in the process. But it is perhaps in the area of inheritance rights
that women, especially in parts of the south, suffer the most – particu-
larly widows, who under the customary practices of some ethnic groups
are denied any right to inherit from their husbands, are sometimes
themselves treated as heritable property, and are ritually humiliated and
abused in the process (Sossou 2002 and authorities cited). Muslim wo-
men are generally not subjected to such extremes, but even they at best
receive lesser shares than similarly situated males under the Islamic
rules of inheritance. Much of this falls through the gaps of the funda-
mental rights provisions of the constitution. Finer-grained provisions,
such as those embodied in the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the
Child and the U.N. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women, unfortunately do not apply: both con-
ventions were ratified long ago by Nigeria, but neither has yet been do-
mesticated, so neither yet has the force of law. We return to this subject
in section 13.9 below.
Further details of any of Nigeria’s bodies of personal law and custom
are beyond the scope of this paper. Readers interested in Islamic perso-
nal law as applied in northern Nigeria in particular might well start
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with J.N.D. Anderson’s long essay on Nigeria in his book on Islamic
Law in Africa (Anderson 1954: 171-224). Anderson, himself deeply
versed in the fiqh of all the major schools of Islamic law, made a tour of
all parts of the then-Northern Region, conversing, often directly in
Arabic, with the Sultan of Sokoto, many emirs, the chief alkalis and
other court personnel, the Sudanese lecturers at the Kano School of
Arabic Studies, and leading ulama (ibid: 183-184). The survey based on
those discussions ranges over many aspects of Islamic law as applied in
the various parts of the Region, including ‘those modifications of the
pure Shari‘a in favour of local custom which are noticeable, in greater
or lesser degree, in the day to day work of even the most staunchly
Muslim courts’ (ibid: 172). Let one example suffice:
The maintenance due to a wife [...] is everywhere calculated by
exclusive reference to the husband’s means: and this, while rea-
sonable enough, is directly contrary to the normal Maliki rule,
as the better jurists in Nigeria fully realise. This provides a good
example of a point on which customary law has everywhere tri-
umphed (ibid: 208).22
No doubt the position has changed in some respects in the half-century
since: probably not very much, but no one really knows because the sort
of investigation made by Anderson, certainly on anything like the same
scale, has never been repeated. That Islamic personal law as applied in
northern Nigeria is still often contaminated by local custom antithetical
to women is confirmed by the work of the Federation of Muslim
Women Associations in Nigeria (FOMWAN), founded in 1985 (Yusuf
1993), and more recently by the attitude taken toward sharia implemen-
tation by Muslim women activists.
Most Muslim women activists are working within the Sharia im-
plementation paradigm: trying to use the [...] Islamic legal tradi-
tion to achieve more gender and social justice within Muslim fa-
milies and communities. The enemy is “merely traditional prac-
tices” oppressive to women, which do not have – or should not
have – the sanction of religion (Nasir 2007: 118, with details of
the activist agenda at 100-105).
Sharia implementation
has stimulated many women to a deeper study of Islamic law
and its sources. […] [This] has in turn fed back into the work of
individual women lawyers and of NGOs like WRAPA and
BAOBAB, of providing legal education and counsel and
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representation to women in legal matters of all sorts – not only
criminal cases, but especially family matters such as marriage
contracts and divorce settlements, child custody, maintenance,
and widow’s inheritances (ibid: 99-100).
13.7 Criminal law
Nigeria’s southern states apply criminal and criminal procedure statutes
dating from colonial days, derived from English law. In all northern
states, the Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes of 1960 are still in
force, as variously amended by the states. And now, in the sharia states,
running in parallel to the Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes of
1960, there are also Sharia Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes: the
1960 codes are applied in the Magistrate’s and High Courts, the sharia
codes in the Sharia Courts.23 In this section we briefly discuss the new
Sharia Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes. We can do no more than
skim the surface of this interesting topic. For further details see Peters
2003 and Ostien 2007: IV.
The sharia codes are substantially based on the 1960 codes, with
about 89 per cent of Sharia Penal Code sections coming from the Penal
Code, and all of 99 per cent of Sharia Criminal Procedure Code sec-
tions coming from the Criminal Procedure Code (Ostien 2007: IV, 157-
68 and 338-43). Particularly in the Sharia Penal Codes, however, there
has been considerable alteration of Penal Code sections used, with the
effect, together with new sections added, of infusing the Sharia Penal
Codes with the letter and the spirit of Islamic criminal law of the
Maliki school.
Thus, the substantive offences, covered in eighteen chapters of the
Penal Code (312 sections), have been reorganised into just three chap-
ters of the Sharia Penal Codes (290 sections on average). The three
chapters are entitled ‘Hudud and Hudud-Related Offences’, ‘Qisas and
Qisas-Related Offences’, and ‘Ta’azir Offences’. The sections defining
the classical hudud and qisas offences (see notes 6 and 7) have been re-
drafted in accordance with Maliki doctrine, and the classical punish-
ments – amputation for certain thefts, stoning to death for certain acts
of extra-marital sex, retaliation in kind for woundings and homicides
unless waived by the victims or their heirs, and so on – have been im-
posed. Apostasy is not criminalised in any code,24 but in some of them,
in their sections on offences relating to religion, insulting the Prophet
or defiling the Qur’an are made punishable by death. The defence of
provocation to woundings and homicides, available under the Penal
Code, has been eliminated from the Sharia Penal Codes, and other de-
fences inserted, for instance, for acts ‘done by a person compelled by
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necessity to protect his person, property or honour, or the person, prop-
erty or honour of another from imminent grave danger’.
The ‘ta’azir offences’25 have been copied wholesale from the Penal
Code, but the punishments have been much adjusted, by tinkering with
numbers of years of imprisonment or amounts of fines, and often by
specifying a certain number of ‘lashes’ in addition or in the alternative
to imprisonment or fine. The Penal Code already allowed judges con-
siderable discretion in sentencing, including discretion to substitute
caning or payment of compensation for any other punishment in most
cases; the Sharia Penal Codes continue this broad discretion and ex-
pand it further, allowing also a sentence of reprimand, warning, exhor-
tation, or boycott to be passed ‘on any offender in lieu of, or in addition
to any other punishment to which he might be sentenced for any of-
fence not punishable with death, or offences falling under hudud and qi-
sas’. This restores the almost unlimited discretion of the classical qadi
in ta’azir cases, at least in the matter of sentencing.
There is considerable variation among the Sharia Penal Codes, some
of it trivial, some of it less so. To give just one example: whereas most
Sharia Penal Codes punish criminal breach of trust by a public servant
with imprisonment, fine, and/or lashing, Kano punishes it with ‘ampu-
tation of his right hand [...] and [...] imprisonment for not less than five
years and stolen wealth shall be confiscated’. There has been a project
on to ‘harmonise’ the Sharia Penal Codes (and also the Sharia Criminal
Procedure Codes, among which there is less variation), so far without
much success.
The Sharia Criminal Procedure Codes are almost completely copied
from the Criminal Procedure Code of 1960, not, of course, without
some changes. A number of CPC sections are left out, notably entire
chapters on proceedings in Magistrate’s and High Courts not necessary
in codes to be used only in Sharia Courts. The Sharia Criminal
Procedure Codes also all omit, unaccountably, a section of the Criminal
Procedure Code prohibiting a court from taking cognisance of an adul-
tery case except upon the complaint of the husband or guardian of the
woman involved, or, if she is unmarried, of her father or guardian: this
section, if present, would have stopped before they started most of the
zina cases so far prosecuted, including the famous cases of Safiyatu
Hussaini and Amina Lawal. The ‘Harmonised Sharia Criminal
Procedure Code’ put forward by the Centre for Islamic Legal Studies of
Ahmadu Bello University restores this section, and in Safiyatu’s case
the Sharia Court of Appeal of Sokoto State went even further, essentially
restricting to the guilty person him- or herself the power to bring a zina
case (Ostien 2007: IV, 189 and V, 15-16).
Only three sections are entirely new to the Sharia Criminal
Procedure Codes. Two allow alkalis to order restitution or compensation
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in amounts beyond their powers to impose fines or civil damages (dif-
ferent grades of courts have different powers in these regards). The
third relates to qisas:
When a person is sentenced to suffer qisas for injuries the sen-
tence shall direct that the qisas be carried out in the like manner
the offender inflicted such injury on the victim.
This is closely related to the section on mode of execution of death sen-
tences. The Criminal Procedure Code of 1960 had: ‘When a person is
sentenced to death, the sentence shall direct that he be hanged by the
neck till he is dead’. The Sharia Criminal Procedure Codes have
instead:
[…] the sentence shall direct that: (a) he be beheaded; (b) in case
of qisas, he be caused to die in the like manner he caused the
death of his victim…; (c) in case of zina, he be stoned to death;
and (d) in case of hirabah [see note 6], he be caused to die by
crucifixion.
Before a sentence of qisas is passed, the court is to ‘invite the blood rela-
tives of the deceased person, or the complainant as the case may be, to
express their wishes as to whether retaliation should be carried out, or
diyah should be paid or the accused should be forgiven’;26 in some
states the court is bound by the wishes expressed, in some it may appar-
ently go against them if it ‘sees reason’ to do so.
Two other variations from the Criminal Procedure Code raise ques-
tions of conflict with other law. Under the CPC, ‘an accused person
shall be a competent witness in his own behalf in any inquiry or trial’.
Most Sharia Criminal Procedure Codes, consistently with Maliki doc-
trine, have reversed this, saying ‘shall not’. But the Evidence Act, by
which the Sharia Courts are at a minimum to be ‘guided’, says ‘shall’.
The other conflict relates to numbers of witnesses required to prove
particular facts. The Evidence Act says that ‘no particular number of
witnesses shall in any case be required for the proof of any fact’. But
Kano’s Sharia Criminal Procedure Code requires ‘at least four unim-
peached witnesses’ in prosecutions for zina and ‘at least two witnesses
in other offences’ (ibid: IV, 321). The Sharia Penal Codes of two other
states go even further, extending the four-witness rule to other types of
cases and distinguishing between witnesses depending on whether they
are Muslim or non-Muslim, male or female – Niger doubles the num-
ber of witnesses required in many types of cases if they are females
(ibid: 142). But this raises a final point. The laws establishing the Sharia
Courts all lay down that ‘[t]he applicable laws and rules of procedure for
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the hearing and determination of all civil and criminal proceedings be-
fore the Sharia Courts shall be as prescribed under Islamic law.’ Under
this general directive the Sharia Courts in all states are applying a great
many Islamic rules of procedure and evidence not contained in any en-
acted code but found only in the classical Islamic sources including the
books of fiqh. The rules about numbers of witnesses are an example:
they are expressed in only some of the codes, but are nevertheless pre-
sumably being applied in all the Sharia Courts. This opens up a wide
potential for conflict of laws. How two of the conflicts that have arisen
so far were resolved, is discussed in Ostien 2007: IV, 190-191.
The Sharia Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes have been in force
for a number of years now. Many sentences shocking to modern sensi-
bilities – of amputation of hands for theft, of other forms of mutilation
as retaliation for injuries inflicted, of dire forms of execution, including
stoning to death for zina and stabbing to death with the same knife the
condemned man had used to kill his victims – have been imposed by
the Sharia Courts (Weimann 2007 studies the cases from 2000 to
2004; more have accumulated since). What is notable, however, is how
few of these sentences have actually been executed. Of the probably sev-
eral hundred sentences of amputation of hands for theft, only three
have been carried out, all very soon after sharia implementation started.
None of the other sentences of mutilation appear to have been exe-
cuted, no one has been stoned to death, and Sani Rodi, the double mur-
derer sentenced to be stabbed to death, was hanged instead.
The reason for this is to be found in another provision of all Sharia
Criminal Procedure Codes, which lays down that no sentence of the
type under discussion can be executed unless and until the state gover-
nor expressly consents: and the governors are not consenting. The gov-
ernors’ immediate constituencies are the mostly-Muslim populations of
their states, yes. But the governors, more than most other citizens, are
brought face to face with the wider interests of their states within the
Nigerian federation and internationally, where many pressures have
been brought to bear against permitting the execution of types of sen-
tences viewed in most of the rest of the federation and in much of the
rest of the world as outmoded and inhumane. Moreover many of the
sharia state governors – including Alhaji Ahmad Sani of Zamfara State,
who started the sharia implementation ball rolling – have harboured
ambitions for national office, including the presidency, and they must
have recognised that to permit execution of the many sentences of am-
putation, stoning to death and severe forms of qisas that the Sharia
Courts have imposed would ruin their hopes. The result has been that
with the exception of the three amputations for theft carried out in the
very early days of sharia implementation, the persons on whom such
sentences have been imposed are being quietly dealt with in other ways.
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Unfortunately, this often amounts simply to leaving them indefinitely
in prison waiting (often for years, for small offences) for someone to do
something about them. Nevertheless, the fact that the archaic punish-
ments now reinstated in the laws of the sharia states, although they are
being imposed as sentences by the Sharia Courts, are not actually being
executed, is one important reason why the early Nigerian and world cla-
mour over sharia implementation has so thoroughly subsided. We re-
turn to the problem of all those unexecuted sentences in section 10
below.
We have been discussing the Sharia Penal and Criminal Procedure
Codes. But we must not leave the subject of criminal law without men-
tioning the assorted other statutes having penal implications enacted by
various sharia states, or in some cases by local governments within the
states. Aimed at ‘sanitising society’, these laws address subjects some-
times also touched on in the penal codes or other existing legislation: li-
quor, gambling, prostitution, the operation of cinema houses and video
and film viewing centres, obscenity, certain sorts of extravagance, wo-
men’s dressing, hawking by young girls, women riding on commercial
motorcycles, unwholesome market practices, begging, and so on. For
instance, four states, not content simply to revoke existing liquor li-
cences and refuse to issue any more, have repealed their Liquor Laws
entirely and enacted total bans on the manufacture and sale of liquor;
Kano has also gone further to ban consumption – by anyone, not just
Muslims – on pain of a fine of fifty thousand naira (about E 222) or up
to one year’s imprisonment or both; although this was enacted in 2004
it has yet to be enforced in the non-Muslim parts of Kano City and it is
hard to see how it ever can be. In Gummi Local Government Area of
Zamfara State, to try and cut down on frivolous expenditure and un-
seemly display, ‘all forms of procession during wedding and naming
festivities’, including ‘rallies with vehicles, motorcycles, bicycles, don-
keys, horses, camels, etc.’, and ‘all types of musical concerts’, including
‘drumming, praise singing and dancing in whatever form and howso-
ever called’, are prohibited on pain of a fine of three thousand naira or
six months imprisonment or both. Zamfara State has added to existing
national anti-corruption legislation by enacting its own Anti-Corruption
Commission Law complete with a series of sections defining criminal
offences and prescribing punishments. This miscellany of legislation is
collected and analysed in Ostien 2007: III.
13.8 Other legal areas, especially economic law
Dividing the sharia up according to Western categories, we have dis-
cussed ‘Islamic personal law’ and ‘Islamic criminal law’. On the private
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law side what is left over is what we have been calling ‘other Islamic ci-
vil law’, including all the rules that still govern the business relations
and commercial transactions of millions of northern Muslims on a daily
basis: ‘sale, loan, bailment, security, hire, lost property, tort, agency, co-
proprietorship to mention some of those that commonly come before
the courts’ (Report 1952: 121).
Like Islamic personal law, other Islamic civil law survived the
Settlement of 1960, when Islamic criminal law was abrogated. Again
like Islamic personal law, other Islamic civil law as applied in Nigeria
has never been codified: it is still applied, primarily in the north’s
Sharia and Area Courts, on the basis of the Maliki fiqh, no doubt modi-
fied in favour of local custom in various ways in various places. The dif-
ference is that other Islamic civil law was not protected from exposure
to the ‘English’ courts in the ways that Islamic personal law was. The
High Courts have long had concurrent original jurisdiction, with the
Native Courts and their descendants, of cases arising under all the
‘other civil’ part of ‘native law and custom’; and as we have seen, ap-
peals from the judgments of the Native and subsequently the Area
Courts in all such cases, even when governed by Islamic law, were from
1960 directed to the High Courts, not to the Sharia Courts of Appeal.
The primary reason for this difference of treatment seems to have
been a felt need in certain circles for uniformity in this ‘other civil’ area
of law:
Economic development may be retarded by a piecemeal system
of law, and it may be fostered if there is one unified system of
law which enables all persons in the territory to enter freely into
commercial transactions. [...] Laws concerning trade and com-
merce should, in any event, be uniform throughout a territory.
[...] The general law of torts or wrongs, and of restitution for
money had and received, should be uniformly applicable to per-
sons of all communities. [...] There should be a general law of
contract [...] uniformly applicable to persons of all communities,
races or creeds (Allott 1971: 6-8, quoting conclusions of the
1960 London Conference on the Future of Law in Africa).
Joined to the felt need for uniformity was the hope that the High
Courts, and the federal appellate courts above them, could perhaps
bring it about:
It is vital that [this part of Islamic and customary law] should be
moulded and developed by the superior courts so that it fits in,
both with the social needs of the country, and with the rest of
the law which is of statutory or exotic origin (Allott 1964: 192).
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Whether the decisions of the superior courts have had the desired effect
may be doubted. Whether any failure in this regard (as opposed to a
thousand other factors) has retarded economic development may also
be doubted. Perhaps Allott and his colleagues got the developmental
cart before the horse. In Nigeria many subjects crucial to modern eco-
nomic development – bankruptcy, banks, corporations, insurance, la-
bour, patents, professional occupations, securities, trade and commerce
with other countries and between the states, and more – are governed
exclusively by federal legislation (1999 constitution, IId Sched. Pt. I). As
the economy develops, more and more of it will come under the sway
of this legislation and of the lawyers and their common law which the
legislation will inevitably carry along with it, and related litigation will
go more and more to the High Courts only. In the meantime, most
Nigerians, not having reached that stage, are still content to order their
affairs in accordance with the law they know, which in the Muslim
north is the ‘other Islamic civil law’ we have been discussing. The pro-
grammes of sharia implementation have brought little new in this re-
gard: the venue of litigation changed from Area Courts to Sharia
Courts, and, more problematically, the redirection of appeals to the
Sharia Courts of Appeal instead of the High Courts. As we have seen
(see 13.5), the expansion of Sharia Court of Appeal jurisdiction in the
sharia states, beyond the subject of Islamic personal law, to other
Islamic civil law and to Islamic criminal law as well, has already been
declared unconstitutional by the High Courts of two states, and in the
end will probably fail altogether unless the constitution is amended.
A great deal of business in the north is conducted in open-air mar-
kets in all the cities and towns. Among the hopes expressed for sharia
implementation was that it would purify practices in these markets.
[U]nscrupulous people have filled our markets and nobody can
stop them from what they are doing. […] The above [particularly
the practices of self-imposed middlemen, discussed at length]
are the main problems facing us and we hope that as the imple-
mentation of Sharia takes shape in this State, such practices will
in time be wiped out […] because they are harmful to both Islam
and to Muslims. […] Government should ensure standard mea-
suring units in terms of weights and volume for goods to ensure
fairness in business transactions. Price and quality control task
forces should be established at various levels to supervise and
enforce strict adherence to Islamic laws on business transactions
(from memoranda to the Bauchi State Sharia Implementation
Committee, in Ostien 2007: II, 52, 91, 96).
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These goals of sharia implementation are being pursued by various orga-
nisations that have been charged with these tasks. In Kano State, for in-
stance, the Sharia Commission is to ‘initiate and implement policies that
will sanitise business transactions in our markets and ensure orderly re-
lationships among the general public in accordance with dictates of
Islamic injunctions’ (Kano State Sharia Commission Law 2003: §4(iv)).
In Zamfara State the Markets Affairs Committee of the Joint Aid
Monitoring Group on the Application of Sharia ‘is responsible for enligh-
tening the dwellers in our markets on the provisions of Sharia in their re-
spective business transactions. It also mediates and resolves amicably
any case between buyers and sellers, ensures the use of Government-ap-
proved measures/scales in our markets, monitors any transaction in the
market and refers any breach of Sharia law in buying and selling to the
appropriate authority’ (Joint Aid Monitoring Group, undated). At least
one local government, in Yobe State, has enacted a by-law ‘to make provi-
sion for the prohibition of certain un-Islamic practices such as non-main-
tenance of standard grains measure, middlemanship and other matters
related thereto’; other matters prohibited by this law include ‘any act of
slaughtering and selling of meats of donkeys, horses, pigs, dogs and
other categories of prohibited animals’ (Ostien 2007: III, 230-233).
Obviously none of this involves new applications of sharia but attempted
purging from old applications of corrupting local custom.
We have already mentioned (see 13.5) the attempts in most sharia
states to revivify and institutionalise the collection and distribution of
zakat, with four states going so far as to make payment mandatory and
enforceable in the courts (it is not known that any such action has so
far been taken). The institutions charged with administering zakat are
variously the Ministries of Religious Affairs, the Sharia Commissions,
or, in six states, new Zakat Boards set up especially for the purpose, but
in all cases working with and through the emirate councils, the local
governments, and local committees going all the way down to village le-
vel. Good is being done. For instance Zamfara State’s Zakat Board re-
ports that between 2000 and 2005 it collected N106,855,630.63 (about
E 474,915) in zakat from which about 35,000 destitute persons bene-
fited, plus 49,590 bags of grain from which almost 124,000 benefited.
With the money the sick are being treated, low-cost housing is being
built or refurbished, small capital and equipment are being provided to
help people start businesses, marriages are being facilitated, debts are
being paid off, wayfarers are being assisted, and so on (Zamfara State
Zakat and Endowment Board 2006). Several of the new boards also
have charge of pious endowments (awqaf or wakfs), which they are to
encourage and to administer as trustees. This is a fairly recent depar-
ture: in the early 1950s Anderson found that in Northern Nigeria ‘there
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are no endowments or trusts of the sort termed ahbas or awqaf, except
in so far as mosques are concerned’ (Anderson 1954: 217).
Land law is a subject apart. The basic document is the federal Land
Use Act, dating from 1978, Chapter L5 of the Laws of the Federation of
Nigeria 2004. According to the explanatory note, the Act
vests all land comprising the territory of each State (except land
vested in the Federal Government or its agencies) solely in the
Governor of the State, who would hold such land in trust for the
people and would henceforth be responsible for allocation of
land in all urban areas to individuals resident in the State and to
organisations for residential, agricultural, commercial and other
purposes, while similar powers with respect to non-urban areas
are conferred on Local Governments.
There are thus ‘statutory rights of occupancy’, granted by the governors,
and ‘customary rights of occupancy’, granted by the local governments.
One might have rights under Islamic law to either of these forms of R of
O, e.g. by inheritance or by prescription. Or one might have rights un-
der Islamic law under a customary R of O, such rights being included
in the bundle the R of O itself comprises. But here an important histor-
ical fact comes in again: even under the Sokoto Caliphate, ‘the custom-
ary land law remained valid and was enforced by the councils of the sul-
tan and of the emirs’ (Schacht 1964: 86, already quoted in section 13.1
above); in the early 1950s Anderson found that ‘[i]t is in the matter of
land tenure that native law and custom has won its most decisive vic-
tory over the general ascendancy of the Shari‘a in the Muslim Emirates
of Northern Nigeria’ (Anderson 1954: 184). In other words the strict
Islamic sharia has never had much influence on land law as actually
practiced even in the Muslim parts of the North. Whether that influence
is waxing or waning at the present time we cannot say.
Finally, we come to Islamic banking and insurance, both subject to
federal regulation. Takaful is a form of insurance that is ‘sharia
compliant’.
[Nigeria’s] main takaful provider, African Alliance Insurance
(AAI) [...] began offering life and family takaful in 2003 and
quickly attracted thousands of applications. This prompted a
host of other Nigerian financial organisations to apply to the
National Insurance Commission for licences to underwrite taka-
ful products (Ford 2007).
Similarly, the Central Bank of Nigeria, responding to a growing de-
mand, has granted permission to a number of banks to offer sharia
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compliant accounts and other products, and in doing so has showed it-
self responsive to a growing demand for this kind of banking. Nigeria’s
first ‘fully-fledged Islamic bank’, to be known as Jaiz Bank International,
has been in the works for some time, but is still trying, it seems
(October 2009), to raise the minimum capital reserve required under
the banking regulations before it can start in business.
13.9 International treaty obligations and human rights
Since 1960 all of Nigeria’s constitutions have included a chapter on
Fundamental Rights; this is a standard bill of civil and political rights
derived primarily from the European Convention on Human Rights of
1950, enforceable in the courts. Another chapter on ‘Fundamental
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy’, articulating broad
social, economic, environmental and other aspirations, is not justiciable.
In 1981 Nigeria also ratified the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights; the Charter was then domesticated in Nigeria in 1983,
and has now become Chapter A9 of the Laws of the Federation 2004.
This raises a point to which we shall return, which is that in Nigeria,
no treaty has the force of law domestically unless and until it is enacted
by the National Assembly, then ratified by a majority of the state
Houses of Assembly, and finally signed by the president (Art. 12 of the
constitution). Nigeria has in fact ratified or adhered to most of the
world’s human rights instruments, but in some cases domestication has
been difficult (Obiagwu & Odinkalu 2003: 229). There is a National
Human Rights Commission, mandated to ‘deal with all matters relating
to the protection of human rights as guaranteed by [the constitution, the
African Charter], the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and other
international treaties on human rights to which Nigeria is a signatory’ (§5
of the National Human Rights Commission Act 1995, now Chapter N46,
Laws of the Federation 2004).
In any case the main problem in Nigeria, as in many other countries,
is not with the rights but with their realisation. Violation of even the
most basic civil and political rights by state organs and their agents, to
say nothing of social and economic rights, is a commonplace of every-
day life throughout Nigeria. We needn’t rehearse these problems here.
At least two organisations – the U.S. Department of State and Human
Rights Watch – issue annual reports on human rights practices in most
countries of the world, including Nigeria; the sad story can be read in
those reports.27 Here we have space only to mention some of the hu-
man rights issues raised by the sharia implementation programme in
particular.
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Criminal law
The reinstatement of Islamic criminal law is the obvious place to start.
Three issues immediately suggest themselves. (1) In the sharia states,
parallel penal codes are now being applied, under which, for the same
crime, different punishments are prescribed for different people de-
pending solely on their religion. This seems clearly to violate the consti-
tutional ban (Art. 42) on discrimination based solely on religion. (2)
Article 42 also bans discrimination based on sex, but as we have seen
discrimination between male and female witnesses has been reinstated,
implicitly under the Sharia Courts Laws and explicitly in some of the
Sharia Penal and Criminal Procedure Codes. Notoriously, certain sorts
of evidence apply against females only; hence several women, pregnant
out of wedlock, have been convicted of zina and sentenced to death,
while the equally guilty men, denying everything, got off scot-free. (3)
The archaic punishments now reinstated seem to many to violate the
constitutional ban (Art. 34) on cruel, inhuman or degrading punish-
ment or treatment. This provision has hardly been applied by the
Nigerian courts. But courts elsewhere have held that it means, among
other things, that punishment must not be disproportionate to the of-
fence; and death for adultery, or amputation of a hand for theft of a
cow, today seem disproportionate. Lawful punishments may not be car-
ried out in an unlawful manner; and although the death penalty is law-
ful in Nigeria, its infliction by stoning, stabbing, or crucifixion should
be beyond the bounds. Some punishments have in some jurisdictions
been declared unlawful per se: the death penalty in South Africa; flog-
ging in the European Union. What of amputation of hands and other
forms of mutilation? The Nigerian courts might outlaw these if given
the chance in proper cases.
But the interesting point about all these issues is that the courts are
not being given the chance to address them, because they are not being
raised by parties with standing to do so – i.e. defendants in criminal
cases in the Sharia Courts. Most such defendants are not represented by
counsel and have no conception of their constitutional rights. Even
where counsel – in most cases themselves Muslims – do come in to de-
fend, they are not raising issues that might strike at the very heart of the
sharia implementation programme. Why they are not has been discussed
in a paper by one of the lawyers who represented Safiyatu Hussaini and
Amina Lawal (Yawuri 2007: 133, 139). Meantime, as we have seen, actual
execution of the punishments in question has been very rare, the execu-
tive and judicial officials of the sharia states, between them, finding ways
to limit the many kinds of damage this would cause.
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Women
The classical Islamic law of personal status, the family, and inheritance,
still applied in Nigeria, discriminates in various ways against women.
These issues, some touched on in section 13.6 above, are well known
and need no further discussion here. A number of the new enactments
of the sharia states also specifically affect women. Most of these have to
do in one way or another with trying to keep unrelated males and fe-
males apart, or, where they do mix together, with trying to make the fe-
males less sexually attractive to the males. Thus, some jurisdictions
have made the hijab28 compulsory for all female Muslims ten or more
years old appearing in public. Even where no law requires it, the hijab
has become quasi-compulsory through regulations governing state insti-
tutions, including schools, and, outside such institutions, through pres-
sure exerted by hisbah groups. Attempts have been made to keep males
and females separated in taxis and buses, and to keep females off of
commercial motorcycles (all operated by men); the result of the at-
tempts of the Kano hisbah to enforce the ban there on commercial mo-
torcycles carrying female passengers has already been described. The
regulation of hawking by young girls, a matter of concern in the North
for some time because it exposes the girls to unscrupulous men ready
to pay for sex or have it by force, has in some states been tightened.
Some jurisdictions have tried, without much success it seems, to stop
social mixing of Muslim males and females at events like weddings and
naming ceremonies (also targeted by sumptuary laws as we have seen).
Whether any of this violates the human rights of the women is debata-
ble. In any case women apparently do not feel particularly oppressed by
most of it, except where it has impinged on their livelihoods or mobility
or on their traditional modes of socialising and enjoyment; there the
women have resisted or simply ignored it (Nasir 2007: 105-118). As we
noted in section 13.6, Muslim women activists have not so much ob-
jected to sharia implementation, as they have tried to work within it, to
effectuate rights of women under the sharia which ‘merely traditional
practices’ have denied them (ibid: 100-103).
One such right is the right to education; and here we come to the
case of a human rights instrument which Nigeria has ratified, but has
not yet been able to domesticate. The U.N. Convention on the Rights of
the Child (CRC) was ratified by Nigeria in 1991. The CRC’s most con-
troversial provision (in Nigeria) puts the minimum age for marriage at
eighteen years. But in Nigeria’s Muslim north particularly, girls are of-
ten married off much younger, even as early as nine or ten. This ob-
viously keeps them out of school; it also contributes to a serious public
health problem in the north, vesico-vaginal fistula, which results from
early pregnancy and child-birth. In 2003 the National Assembly took
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the first step towards domestication of the CRC by enacting it, over con-
siderable (male) Muslim opposition, as the Child Rights Act. Many pro-
minent Muslim women and women’s organisations, among others,
have since campaigned for ratification of the Child Rights Act by the
states. But, despite their efforts, the necessary nineteen states have still
(October 2009) not ratified.29 The fate of the U.N. Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)
has been even worse. Although Nigeria ratified CEDAW in 1985, to date
no bill for domestication has even been enacted by the National
Assembly for ratification by the states.
Non-Muslims
What of the effects of sharia implementation on non-Muslims? In treat-
ing of this topic one must be wary of reports in the popular press, al-
lowing for the errors and exaggerations of reporters who are often ill-
trained and undisciplined and writing for a credulous public ready to
believe anything bad about Islam. Thus, for instance, early reports that
all churches in Zamfara State would be demolished and everyone made
to learn Arabic were sheer nonsense – which nevertheless did their
work of inflaming Christian alarm. One must also try to distinguish be-
tween continuing manifestations of long-standing problems for non-
Muslims, more specifically Christians, living in the northern states, and
anything new resulting from sharia implementation in particular. The
various forms of official discrimination against non-Muslims sanc-
tioned by the classical sharia have since Independence been officially in
abeyance.30 Nevertheless, for many years there have been problems,
ranging from difficulties with whether and where a church may be
built, up to periodic outbreaks of communal violence sparked off by
some incident usually involving not only religion but ethnicity and
‘place of origin’ as well. One variant of this, in Hausaland, is ‘indigen-
ous’ Hausa Muslims vs. ‘settler’ Igbo or Yoruba (or other) Christians.
In Plateau State, where there were serious outbreaks in 2001, 2004 and
2008, it is rather ‘indigenous’ Plateau Christians (from one tribe or an-
other) vs. ‘settler’ Hausa or Fulani Muslims; and so on, there are many
such problems all over the country. These problems can unfortunately
be said to be ‘normal’ right now in Nigeria (see e.g. Human Rights
Watch 2006; Ostien 2009).
Bad as all that is, the further question is, what new problems for
Christians or other non-Muslims living in the sharia states have been
added by the programmes of sharia implementation? This is less clear.
Non-Muslims are for the most part expressly exempted from the new
laws, which are frequently said by the authorities to be ‘for Muslims only’.
Most importantly, non-Muslims are not subject to the Sharia Penal Codes
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or to the jurisdiction of the Sharia Courts (unless they consent in writ-
ing), and it appears that these rules are being strictly observed. Non-
Muslim women and girls are not subject to the rules aimed at separation
of the sexes. Sharia-related laws that do affect non-Muslims, such as the
new ways of regulating liquor and prostitution, are often approved of by
Christian leaders, and in any case are well within the constitutional
authority of the states to enact (Ostien & Umaru 2007).
This does not mean that there has not been some additional trouble for
non-Muslims in the sharia states resulting from sharia implementation,
especially in its early days when the zeal of irregular Muslim enforcers
was at a high pitch. For instance, in some places lawless attempts by self-
appointed hisbah groups to enforce new liquor laws resulted in wanton
destruction of property. Christian women sometimes suffered from at-
tempts of over-enthusiastic youths to enforce the hijab and separation of
the sexes in public transportation. In one famous case, the director of a
federal medical centre in Bauchi State imposed a new uniform of trou-
sers and hijab on his nursing staff, and sacked eleven Christian nurses
who refused to comply (they were subsequently reinstated). But most of
this sort of thing died down fairly quickly, as the authorities got the so-
cial forces unleashed by sharia implementation under better control.
Other problems are less acute. Many sharia states are spending consid-
erable sums on new programmes and institutions specifically for
Muslims, probably not balanced by proportionate spending on non-
Muslims.31 Non-Muslim access to justice may in some places have been
impeded by conversion of the old Area Courts, open to everybody, into
Sharia Courts primarily for Muslims. Nevertheless, for some time
Christians living in the sharia states have been complaining, not so
much about sharia, as about all the many other troubles with Nigeria.
The fact that non-Muslims living in the sharia states have not had to face
significant new or additional continuing burdens resulting from sharia
implementation specifically, is a second important reason (along with
non-execution of the archaic penalties being imposed on some Muslims)
why the early Nigerian clamour over sharia implementation has so com-
pletely died down. Although it continues as an official programme of a
number of northern state governments, and is still advancing on various
fronts, sharia implementation has nevertheless become largely irrelevant
to the national discourse.
13.10 Conclusion
How are the sharia implementation programmes in northern Nigeria
likely to develop in the next five to ten years? Let us begin our answer
by going back to the matter of the sentences of hudud and qisas being
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imposed by the Sharia Courts but never executed, the convicts instead
languishing in prison, sometimes for many years, serving time to
which they were not sentenced and never knowing their fate. How is
this outcome – acceptable to no one – likely to be resolved?
We consider three possibilities.
(i) The governors, under pressure from ardent and impatient sharia imple-
menters, will at last give their consent to execution of these sentences. The
large backlog of pending sentences will be carried out, as will new sen-
tences as they are imposed.
Probability: practically nil.
This would stir up the Nigerian and world-wide clamour all over again,
and result in all sorts of sanctions against any state that tried it. More
importantly, there is now little sentiment among Muslims even in the
sharia states for such a course. After several years of experience with it,
most see that sharia implementation, even in all the useful forms it is
taking, will not quickly cure all social ills, as many at first believed. Real
progress will require the deepening of religious knowledge and practice
among the people; the state also has much work of its own to do; and it
will take a long time. Meantime, of all the forms of sharia implementa-
tion that have been tried, bringing back Islamic criminal law has proved
least useful of all as a means of social betterment, in practice falling in
its harshest aspects only on the poor, who need help more than punish-
ment, while the richer and more powerful, despite all their evident sin-
ning, escape unscathed. Few in any social stratum want to see mutila-
tions resume or anyone stoned to death; the governors will not consent.
(ii) The sharia states will continue to muddle along under the penal legisla-
tion now in place, finding various ways to limit and mitigate the damage.
Probability: high over the near to medium term.
Outright repeal of the Islamic penal legislation so recently enacted
would be politically impossible. But three states (Borno, Gombe and
Yobe), even eight or nine years after enactment, have not yet even be-
gun to apply their Sharia Penal Codes. In other states the use of the
Sharia Courts to try criminal matters is declining, the charging authori-
ties – the police and the public prosecutors – preferring to charge even
Muslim accused persons in the Magistrate’s and High Courts especially
in serious cases. Where they do try criminal matters, the Sharia Courts,
recognising that they will not be carried out, are imposing hudud pun-
ishments less frequently than at first, finding reasons in the doctrine to
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dispose of such cases in other ways. In qisas cases complainants are en-
couraged to accept diyah in lieu of qisas; at least one state (Kano) has
made this more attractive by enacting that the state must pay if the de-
fendant and his family cannot.
But still: there remain those large backlogs of unexecuted sentences,
the convicts still languishing in prison waiting for something to hap-
pen, and more will doubtless accumulate. What to do with these cases
is very much under discussion in the sharia states. One idea is that the
governors, in the exercise of their constitutional prerogative of mercy,
should substitute less severe forms of punishment for the ones im-
posed, or remit the punishments after some suitable time served, or
pardon the convicts completely; in fact in 2005 twenty-one persons sen-
tenced to amputation of their hands for theft were set free by the gover-
nor of Sokoto State in this way, and the same may also be quietly hap-
pening elsewhere. Another idea is that where the governors refuse to
act, the courts, or one of them, perhaps the High Court or the Sharia
Court of Appeal, should bail the convicts after some time served – pre-
sumably subject to revocation in the unlikely event that the governor
should at some point decide to execute the sentence after all.
Something like this has happened in the case of the Niger State couple,
Fatima Usman and Ahmadu Ibrahim, found guilty of zina in 2002 and
sentenced to stoning to death. They appealed to the Sharia Court of
Appeal, which admitted them to bail pending the outcome. While the
appeal was pending the jurisdiction of the Sharia Court of Appeal to de-
cide it was called into question by the High Court (see note 15 and ac-
companying text). The appeal therefore has never been decided by the
Sharia Court of Appeal, but it has also never been transferred to the
High Court. The couple are still out on bail, and they are unlikely ever
to hear from the authorities about this matter again. None of this is
very tidy, but for the time being it will probably continue.
(iii) The federal courts will rule that the penal legislation now in place is
unconstitutional. The penal law of all sharia states will revert to what
it was before sharia implementation started. All persons still in prison
under sentence of hudud or qisas will be released and no more such
cases will arise.
Probability: quite high in the not too distant future.
Consider only the problem of running parallel penal codes in the same
jurisdiction, under which different punishments for the same crime are
prescribed for different people depending on their religion. This clearly
violates the anti-discrimination provisions of the constitution. The prob-
ability that it will be challenged in the courts is increased by the fact
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that the burden of the discrimination falls not only on Muslims, who
might not be inclined to complain: sometimes it falls on non-Muslims,
who for some crimes can be punished more harshly under the Penal
Codes than Muslims can be under the Sharia Penal Codes (Ostien
2007: IV, 14). It is likely, therefore, that before too long somebody will
raise this issue, that it will eventually reach the federal Court of Appeal
and the Supreme Court, and that they will rule that different penal
codes for people of different religions will not do: each state must have
one and only one penal code applicable in all courts to all persons re-
gardless of their religion. Which code will that be? We may be sure that
non-Muslims will never tolerate application of the Sharia Penal Codes
to them. Furthermore, it is the Sharia Penal Codes that expressly discri-
minate on the basis of religion: for that reason they will likely be struck
down, and the Penal Code of 1960, always intended for universal appli-
cation and still the law in all sharia states, will once again cover the
whole field. When this happens, any persons still in prison awaiting ex-
ecution of sentences of hudud or qisas under the then-outlawed Sharia
Penal Codes will be released, and this problem will finally, and correctly,
have been resolved.
It will have been resolved, moreover, in a way palatable to the vast
majority of the north’s Muslims. They will have done their utmost in
the cause of sharia. The responsibility – or the guilt – for saying ‘no’
once again to the application of Islamic criminal law will fall on the fed-
eral constitution and the distant federal judges who administer it. The
judges, Muslims and non-Muslims all concurring, will give clear and
convincing reasons – reasons that in no way impugn Islamic criminal
law per se – why under the constitution the Sharia Penal Codes may not
be run in parallel with the Penal Codes and must be dropped. Muslims
will resign themselves to this as a matter of necessity under present his-
torical circumstances – there being no possibility, in the foreseeable fu-
ture, of withdrawing from the federation or changing the constitution.
Resignation will be easier because of the evident inutility, even unfair-
ness, of trying to apply Islamic criminal law in its full rigor under pre-
sent social conditions. This is moreover but a very small part of the
whole fabric of the sharia, historically often in abeyance even in
Muslim lands. Letting it go for the indefinite future once again, perhaps
with some sense of relief, the north’s Muslims will pray for better times
ahead, when, God willing, it will come to pass that circumstances will
not be so much against them.
So much for the likely fate of Islamic criminal law, which always
tends to monopolise the discussion. Two important points stand out,
which also apply to all the other, more useful, forms that sharia imple-
mentation is taking. One is the psychological and symbolic importance
of having tried so comprehensively to bring Islamic law and Islamic
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institutions back into the governance of these large Muslim popula-
tions, after the depredations of the British and of the post-colonial era.
The other is the practical education in modern principles of governance
and politics which the continuing sharia implementation effort is bring-
ing with it.
Sharia implementation had to be tried: to work through the obsession,
to honour and reconnect with the north’s Islamic past, and to restore the
Islamic sharia to an honourable position in the Nigerian public space.
Being tried, sharia implementation is doing all those things. At the same
time, it is teaching many useful lessons all around – about how democ-
racy and constitutionalism and federalism work and what it takes to
make them work; about the real causes of social problems; about which
programmes of amelioration and improvement will go how far and what
more might be needed; and about who is serious and who is not, among
others. On all of these subjects sharia implementation has revitalised
and complicated the public discourse involving sharia, including bring-
ing in new voices, notably those of women, whose assertions of their
own Islamically correct positions against oppressive male practices are
making themselves felt. The new Islamic institutions – sharia courts,
councils of ulama, sharia commissions, zakat boards, hisbah organisa-
tions, and so on – which will still be there when the Sharia Penal Codes
pass into history, are providing useful opportunities, for many people,
for the responsible expression of Islamic learning and piety and the
beneficial application of Islamic precepts in all aspects of life.
These are all good things about sharia implementation: ways in
which it has been a positive development for Nigeria itself and for
many of its people. These good things are going some distance in their
various directions towards helping to resolve some of the ‘troubles with
Nigeria’. Unfortunately Nigeria’s troubles are legion, and, along with
the north’s most sincere Muslims, it will also take the sustained and co-
operative efforts of many other people of all religious and ethnic persua-
sions all over the country to even begin to address them. Perhaps, if it
doesn’t just ‘fizzle out’ as President Obasanjo predicted it would, sharia
implementation may at least provide good examples, so sorely needed
in Nigeria, of what can practically be done by committed public officials
working with ordinary citizens to improve the unfortunate circum-
stances in which so many of the people are living.
Notes
1 Philip Ostien taught for many years in the Faculty of Law of the University of Jos,
Nigeria; he is the author or editor of a number of works on the laws and legal institu-
tions of northern Nigeria and the programmes of sharia implementation that began
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there in 1999. Albert Dekker is a reference librarian with the Van Vollenhoven
Institute for Law, Governance and Development of Leiden University.
2 World Factbook: see Bartleby 2010: Nigeria. Linguists: see Lewis 2009: Nigeria.
3 Jihad: ‘struggle’ or ‘striving’, in Islam usually meant in the sense of ‘striving in the
way of Allah’, which may range from personal striving to correct one’s own faults to
armed warfare against those labeled as unbelievers.
4 Qadi: an Islamic judge charged to apply the sharia in cases brought before him.
Alkali: Hausa form of al-qadi.
5 A note on terminology: the Northern Region was sometimes called the Northern
Province or Provinces, and similarly for the South = the East + the West. The names
the British gave to their high officials in Nigeria also changed from time to time. At
the center, Governors-General of the whole country (1914-1919) became Governors
(1919-1954) and then Governors-General again (1954-1963). In the regions High
Commissioners (1900-1908) became Governors (1908-1913), then Lieutenant
Governors (1914-1932), then Chief Commissioners (1932-1951), then Lieutenant
Governors again (1951-1954), and finally Governors again (1954-1966).
6 Hudud: punishments prescribed by Allah for specific offences, namely, in Maliki law,
zina (roughly, sex outside of marriage; punishment: either one hundred lashes if the
offender has never been married or stoning to death if the offender is or has ever
been married); qadhf (wrongful accusation of zina; punishment: eighty lashes); sari-
qah (theft meeting certain conditions; punishment: amputation of the right hand for
the first offence and further amputations for subsequent offences); shurb (drinking
wine, and by extension imbibing other intoxicants; punishment: eighty lashes); hira-
bah (roughly, armed robbery; punishment ranges from amputation of right hand and
left foot up to death by crucifixion depending on circumstances); and ridda (apostasy
from Islam; punishment: death).
7 Qisas: retaliation in kind for woundings or killings: an eye for an eye, etc.
8 Ulama (sing. alim, scholar): Islamic scholars; those learned in the theology and law
of Islam and the literature, mostly in Arabic, proper to these disciplines.
9 In this quotation from Richardson, the order of the last two sentences has been re-
versed, in hopes of enhancing clarity.
10 Allahu Akbar: Allah, God, is great, or the greatest.
11 Zakat: the Islamic ‘alms’ or religious tax, payable annually, in cash or in kind, on
most forms of wealth, and meant in various proportions for the support of specified
classes of people including the destitute, the poor, those in debt, those in bondage,
strangers stranded on the way, new converts to Islam, those ‘striving in the way of
Allah’ including e.g. Qur’anic teachers, and those who administer the tax itself.
12 Hisbah: enjoining what is good and forbidding what is wrong according to the sharia;
by extension, those who enjoin and forbid.
13 The first amputation was performed on 22 March 2000, when the right hand of
Bello Buba Jangebe of Zamfara State was cut off for theft of a cow. Jangebe had de-
clined to appeal the sentence, accepting it as his just desserts under divine law. See
e.g. Nigerian Guardian of 24 March 2000. The complete records of proceedings and
judgments of the courts in the Safiyatu Hussaini and Amina Lawal cases, in English,
together with other information and analysis, are given in Ostien 2007, Vol. V.
14 This episode was reported in Abdulfattah Olajide, ‘Shariah Gains More Ground in
Yorubaland’, Weekly Trust, 15 November 2002, see http://www.corpun.com/ngj00211.
htm.
15 Mai Tangaram vs. Mai Taxi, High Court of Borno State, case no. BOM/5A/2002, rul-
ing dated 28 June 2002 (unreported), notice of appeal filed but appeal abandoned;
and Ibrahim Haruna Kuta vs. Ahmadu Galadima, High Court of Niger State, appeal
no. NSHC/MN/6A/2003, ruling dated 12 September 2004, reported in Law Report of
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Northern Nigeria 2004, 398, appealed on other grounds, CA/A/151/2004, appeal
decided 15 March 2006, see http://courtofappeallibrary.gov.ng/index.php?option=com
_sobi2&sobi2Task=sobi2Details&catid=3&sobi2Id=325&Itemid=.
16 This and subsequent conversions of naira to euros have been calculated at the rate of
225 to 1, around which the actual rate fluctuated in October 2009.
17 The Supreme Court case is reported, see Attorney-General of Kano State vs. Attorney-
General of the Federation (2007) 3 NILR 23, see http://www.nigeria-law.org/Attorney-
General%20of%20Kano%20State%20v%20Attorney-General%20of%20the%
20Federation.htm. For the victory of the Commander and his deputy in their civil
suit, see Daily Triumph, 29 March 2007, internet edition see http://www.triumph-
newspapers.com/archive/DT29032007/right293207.html. The acquittal in the crim-
inal case was reported to one of the authors in a visit to the Kano State Hisbah Board
in March 2008.
18 The establishment clause is the first clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. con-
stitution: ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion….’
The U.S. Supreme Court has read this very broadly: ‘Not simply an established
church, but any law respecting the establishment of religion is forbidden. […] The
Amendment’s purpose was not to strike merely at the official establishment of a sin-
gle sect, creed, or religion. […] It was to create a complete and permanent separation
of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority.’ Everson vs. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1, 31 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). Or, as Justice Black, writing for the
majority, said in the same case: ‘In the words of Jefferson, the clause was intended to
erect a “wall of separation between Church and State.”’ Ibid: 16.
19 Fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence; the detailed working out of the sharia and its proper ap-
plication in various circumstances.
20 Purdah: the seclusion of women, particularly married women.
21 Talak: pronouncement by the husband that he divorces his wife. No special form of
words is necessary, nor are witnesses; the mere pronouncement effects the divorce.
22 Cf. Yusuf 1982: 46-47: ‘local [customs] among the Hausa and other Moslem societies
have become a major source of Islamic law in the Northern States’ (giving many ex-
amples). Doi 1984 gives interesting details of the lives of Nigeria’s Muslims in all
parts of the country, including chapters on ‘The Life-Cycle of Hausa-Fulani Muslims’,
‘The Life-Cycle of Yoruba Muslims’, ‘Sufism and Mystical Practices in Nigeria’, and
‘Syncretism in the Belief and Practices of Muslims in Nigeria’. The ‘Izala’ movement,
very active in the 1970s and 1980s, was in many ways an effort to purge Nigerian
Islam of its syncretism, see Umar 1993 and Loimeier 1997.
23 The situation is actually more complicated than this sentence suggests, in ways it is
perhaps unnecessary to explain here: see Ostien 2007: IV, 6-7, 185-186. But the read-
er should be aware that the following discussion is subject to a variety of exceptions
and qualifications.
24 Unless it has unconstitutionally been incorporated by reference under the section on
‘General offences’ included in some codes, see discussion in 13.5 above.
25 Ta’azir offences: in classical Islamic law, offences defined and punished at the virtually
unfettered discretion of the qadi in particular cases coming before him. In modern
penal law these are defined and the punishments are prescribed by statute. Outside
northern Nigeria the word is more usually transliterated as ta’zir.
26 Diyah: compensation that may be paid to the victim of a wounding, or to certain of
the victim’s relatives in cases of homicide, if the victim or the relatives elect to forego
qisas and accept the diyah instead. Elaborate rules specify the amounts to be paid for
which types of injuries. Acceptance of diyah in lieu of qisas is encouraged; even more
meritorious is the free pardon of the perpetrator by the victim or the relatives.
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27 For the latest reports on Nigeria, both covering 2008, see U.S. Department of State
(2009) and Human Rights Watch (2009).
28 Hijab: a covering worn over other clothing, drawn tightly around the face and drap-
ing loosely down to the knees.
29 There is even debate among the constitutional lawyers as to whether what has been
done so far, by the National Assembly and by the states that have acted on the Child
Rights Act, amounts to steps towards “domestication” of the CRC within the meaning
of Art. 12 of the constitution at all. Our thanks to Dakas C.J. Dakas for drawing this
controversy to our attention, on the complexities of which we cannot enter further
here.
30 One example: in Tela Rijiyan Dorowa vs. Hassan Daudu 1975 NSNLR 87, the Muslim
judge of an Area Court in Sokoto rejected the testimony of a non-Muslim against a
Muslim on the ground that it was ‘not acceptable in Islamic law’. On appeal the
High Court, per another Muslim judge, reversed, holding that under Maliki law the
evidence of a non-Muslim against a Muslim is acceptable in all cases of necessity,
and in Nigeria ‘the necessity […] has always been with us. This is because this coun-
try […] is not a Muslim country but a country where a large number of its inhabitants
are Muslims. Business transactions are bound to occur and have always been occur-
ring between Muslims and non-Muslims. Equally disputes leading to litigations of
Muslims against non-Muslims, as in this case, and vice versa must happen and have
always been happening. In a large cosmopolitan community as exists in Sokoto enga-
ging in a multitude of commercial transactions it would be impossible to do justice
in litigation if a distinction is drawn on the religion a witness adheres to before he
could give evidence in a given case. It would [also] be unconstitutional for any law en-
forced in this country to provide for the rejection of any witness because of his reli-
gion’ (quoting Art. 28(1) of the 1979 constitution prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of religion).
31 To take the extreme case of Zamfara State: there is a Ministry of Religious Affairs
dealing almost exclusively with Muslim matters, including the organisation of
Islamic preaching and teaching across the state, a Council of Ulama, a Sharia
Research and Development Board, a Qur’anic Recitation and Memorization Board, a
Religious Preaching and Establishment of Jumu’at Mosque and Idi Praying Ground
Commission, a Hisbah Commission, and a Zakat and Endowment Board (all to be
documented in forthcoming volumes of Ostien 2007). All of these have their own of-
fices, vehicles and other equipment, paid staffs, and operating budgets.
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